Navy Marine Corps Intranet : an analysis of its approach to the challenges associated with seat management contracting by Bullock, Kenneth F.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2003-06
Navy Marine Corps Intranet : an analysis of its
approach to the challenges associated with seat
management contracting
Bullock, Kenneth F.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1016




Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
NAVY MARINE CORPS INTRANET:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
ITS APPROACH TO THE CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED 









 Thesis Advisor:   Ron B. Tudor 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2003 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Navy Marine Corps Intranet:  An Analysis of its 
Approach to the Challenges Associated with Seat Management Contracting  
6. AUTHOR(S)   Kenneth F. Bullock 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
 
     Since 1997, Government agencies have been implementing seat management approaches to information technology 
contracting.  Also known as desktop outsourcing, seat management is a process whereby agencies outsource all 
maintenance and ownership of their desktop computers, including all required hardware, software, network support, 
maintenance, and help desk services with pricing computed an a per user - or per seat - basis.  The Navy Marine Corps 
Intranet - or NMCI - is arguably the largest and most complex seat management effort undertaken to date.  It is designed 
to eventually cover approximately 360,000 Navy and Marine Corps users. 
 
     This thesis explores the seat management method of contracting and the challenges inherent in this method of acquiring 
desktop computing power.  Such challenges include benchmarking technical performance requirements, establishing 
performance measures, creating effective incentives, preparing for the transition to seat management, and managing the 
required culture change.  The NMCI program's approach to addressing these challenges is analyzed and recommendations 
are provided as to where improvements can be made in order to increase the likelihood that NMCI will achieve its 





15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
107 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Navy Marine Corps Intranet, seat management, contracting, information 
technology, desktop computers, service level agreements. 

































































Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
NAVY MARINE CORPS INTRANET:  AN ANALYSIS OF ITS APPROACH TO 




Kenneth F. Bullock 
GS-13, Department of the Navy 
B.S., LaSalle University, 1988 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 



















Approved by:  Ron B. Tudor 
   Thesis Advisor 
 
 
   Peter J. Proko 
   Second Reader 
 
 
   Douglas A. Brook 




















































 Since 1997, Government agencies have been implementing seat management 
approaches to information technology contracting.  Also known as desktop 
outsourcing, seat management is a process whereby agencies outsource all 
maintenance and ownership of their desktop computers, including all required 
hardware, software, network support, maintenance, and help desk services with 
pricing computed an a per user - or per seat - basis.  The Navy Marine Corps Intranet 
- or NMCI - is arguably the largest and most complex seat management effort 
undertaken to date.  It is designed to eventually cover approximately 360,000 Navy 
and Marine Corps users. 
 
 This thesis explores the seat management method of contracting and the 
challenges inherent in this method of acquiring desktop computing power.  Such 
challenges include benchmarking technical performance requirements, establishing 
performance measures, creating effective incentives, preparing for the transition to 
seat management, and managing the required culture change.  The NMCI program's 
approach to addressing these challenges is analyzed and recommendations are 
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 This thesis explores the “seat management” method of contracting for desktop 
information technology (IT) services.  The research defines seat management and 
identifies the expected benefits of this acquisition approach, as well as explores the 
significant challenges that exist when implementing such an approach.  The Navy Marine 




 Since 1997, Government agencies have been implementing seat management 
approaches to information technology (IT) contracting.  Also known as desktop 
outsourcing, seat management is the process wherein organizations outsource the 
maintenance and ownership of their desktop personal computers (PCs), including all 
required hardware, software, network support, and help desk services.  In its simplest 
terms, seat management involves buying desktop computing power as a unified service 
with pricing computed on a “per user” - or a "per seat" - basis (hence the term seat 
management).   
Accordingly, it differs from traditional outsourcing or contracting approaches 
where an organization might have maintained ownership of the PCs, contracted for 
installation services, and then outsourced help desk support.  In a seat management 
environment, the contractor maintains ownership of all the resources (network hardware, 
desktop hardware, software, etc.) and delivers the resultant computing capability as a 
service, sometimes likened to a utility.   
There can be many possible benefits derived from seat management contracting.  
However, lower costs may not necessarily be one of them.  While organizations that 
embark on a seat management approach hope to save money, most realized benefits are 
in the area of quality improvement.  With proper structuring of the requirements and the 
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contract, commercial expertise and best practices can be leveraged to result in 
improvements such as better response time, more reliable system availability, and/or 
reduced downtime. 
The NMCI contract was awarded in October 2000, and is a multi-year contract 
pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 17.1.  The performance-based, 
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract with Electronic Data Systems 
(EDS) Corporation is expected to eventually cover roughly 360,000 Navy and Marine 
Corps users.  The five-year base period (covering fiscal years 2001 through 2005), plus 
the three-year option period (covering fiscal years 2006 through 2008), have a combined 
maximum value of $6.9 billion.   
NMCI is arguably the largest and most complex seat management effort 
undertaken to date.  In addition to the generic benefits noted above, NMCI hopes to 
benefit the Navy and Marine Corps in other ways by creating collateral savings from 
eliminating many redundant networks and applications, creating increased collaboration 
abilities, and achieving increased network security.   
There are many challenges and issues involved with a seat management approach 
to IT contracting, particularly an approach as large and complex as NMCI.  Examples of 
these challenges include benchmarking technical performance requirements, establishing 
effective performance measures, creating effective incentives, preparing for the transition 
to seat management, and managing the required culture change. 
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate how well the NMCI program is 
responding to the challenges inherent in using a seat management approach to contracting 
for desktop IT services.  Recommendations are provided as to where improvements can 
be made in order to increase the likelihood that that NMCI will achieve its expected 
benefits.
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
How well is the NMCI program responding to the challenges associated with seat 
management contracting and where can improvements be made? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a.  What is the seat management approach to contracting for IT resources? 
b.  What are the expected benefits of a seat management approach? 
c.  What are the expected benefits of NMCI? 
d.  What are the challenges and concerns associated with seat management 
contracting? 
e.  How well is the NMCI program responding to those challenges? 
 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this thesis includes an in depth analysis of the NMCI contract and 
associated execution plans from the Contracting Officer perspective.  This analysis 
evaluates how well NMCI is responding to the key challenges inherent in seat 
management contracting (or IT outsourcing in general), which are identified through the 
literature review.  The analysis is from a business perspective.  Therefore, a technical 
analysis of the security (i.e., “information assurance”) requirements of NMCI, for 
example, is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Throughout this thesis, the terms 
"contractor," "vendor," and "service provider" are used synonymously.  
   
E. METHODOLOGY 
 The research for this thesis consisted of several steps.  First, a comprehensive 
literature review of journal articles, General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, and other 
library information resources was conducted.  Second, an in-depth content analysis was 
conducted of the NMCI contract, the NMCI Execution Plan, and other NMCI-related 
documentation to identify the program’s response to key challenges.  Third, an interview 
was conducted with key NMCI administration personnel such as the Lead Administrative 
Contracting Officer (LACO) to further explore how NMCI is dealing with the most 
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significant issues.   As a result of these steps, the researcher was able to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the NMCI program’s response to the key challenges inherent in seat 
management contracting, evaluate the likelihood that NCMI will satisfactorily meet those 
challenges as it strives to achieve its desired benefits, identify areas where improvement 
is needed, and recommend specific changes. 
 
F. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
 This thesis analyzes how the NMCI program is responding to the challenges 
inherent in seat management contracting.  Recommendations are provided as to how 
NMCI can better meet those challenges.  As the program evolves from the transition 
stage, through implementation, to a steady-state status, these recommendations may 
prove helpful to key NMCI program officials.  This thesis is also available to other 
organizations seeking to design a seat management contracting approach. 
  
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
 Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II provides a more thorough 
definition of seat management contracting, a description of the NMCI program, an 
examination of the benefits of seat management contracting in general, and a discussion 
of the expected benefits of NMCI.   
 Chapter III provides a detailed examination of the challenges and concerns 
associated with the seat management method of contracting.  Typical challenges involve 
benchmarking technical performance requirements, establishing effective performance 
measures, identifying effective incentives, preparing for the transition to seat 
management, and managing the required culture change. 
 Chapter IV provides an in depth analysis of the NMCI program's response to the 
challenges explored in the preceding chapter.  The effectiveness of NMCI's approach to 
handling the challenges inherent in the seat management method of IT contracting will 
greatly influence the likelihood that the program will achieve its expected benefits. 
 Chapter V provides conclusions, recommendations, and answers to the research 
questions.  This chapter also suggests areas for further research. 
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II. SEAT MANAGEMENT CONTRACTING 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter discusses seat management contracting and the NMCI program in 
order to establish the background and reference point for the analysis of the challenges 
associated with this contracting method, and the detailed analysis of NMCI's approach to 
those challenges, that will come in later chapters.  This chapter provides a working 
definition of seat management contracting and a description of the NMCI program.  The 
chapter also provides an examination of the benefits of seat management contracting in 
general along with a discussion of the expected benefits of NMCI. 
 
B. DEFINITION AND EVIRONMENT 
Sometimes referred to as "desktop outsourcing," seat management is the process 
wherein organizations outsource the maintenance and ownership of their personal 
computers (PCs), including all required components and support -- from hardware and 
software to network support and help desk services [Ref. 1].  In the Government arena, 
seat management is when "federal agencies turn over their computers and networks to 
private contractors, who handle everything from buying and maintaining the technology 
to providing support services." [Ref. 2]  The General Services Administration (GSA), one 
of the Government agencies credited with pioneering this approach, defines seat 
management in a broader sense as a way for agencies "to acquire their entire distributed 
computing environment, including managed lifecycle support, from a single point of 
contact."  [Ref. 3] 
In its simplest terms, seat management is where an organization buys its desktop 
computing power as a "unified service" with pricing computed on a per user (or per 
"seat") basis whereby the contractor is responsible to deliver all hardware, software, 
network support, help desk services, planning/design, and maintenance/installation 
services [Ref. 3].  Seat management is more than leasing…it has been described as a 
"radical reinvention" of how an organization obtains its desktop computing capability 
when everything is outsourced [Ref. 1].  Accordingly, it differs from traditional 
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outsourcing or contracting approaches where an organization might have maintained 
ownership of the PCs, contracted for installation services, and then outsourced network 
support and help desk services.  In a seat management environment, the contractor 
maintains ownership of all the resources (network hardware, desktop hardware, software, 
etc.) and delivers the resultant computing capability - and all related support - as a 
service, sometimes likened to a utility.  Seat management contracts are classified as 
service contracts. 
 The theory is that, like most outsourcing initiatives, by transferring ownership 
and responsibility of its IT resources, an organization can focus on its core missions and 
leave maintenance of IT capabilities to firms that specialize in it [Ref. 1].  Ideally, such 
an approach saves the organization both the cost and difficulty of managing the IT 
resources [Ref. 2].  According to the Outsourcing Institute, IT continues to be the area 
where most outsourcing dollars are spent, and IT represents more than 20% of all 
outsourcing expenditures [Ref. 4].   
Outsourcing of IT (including through seat management types of approaches) is 
likely to be a large piece of that spending as businesses look for the most promising ways 
to maximize their return on their IT investments.  Within the Department of Defense 
(DoD), IT outsourcing initiatives are likely to increase.  Speaking at the kick-off 
ceremony of the 2001 Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week, Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld stated that focusing on the core missions of Defense and contracting 
out the rest makes sense, and that “surely we can outsource more computer system 
support.”  [Ref. 5] 
Seat management approaches to acquiring information technology first appeared 
in the Government during the late 1990s.  Two early examples were the Outsourcing 
Desktop Initiative for NASA (ODIN) and GSA's Seat Management Services contract.  
Arguably, the most comprehensive Government seat management contract to date is the 
Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).   
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C. NAVY MARINE CORPS INTRANET (NMCI) 
The NMCI contract was awarded in October 2000, and is a multi-year contract 
pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 17.1.  The performance-based, 
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract with Electronic Data Systems 
(EDS) Corporation is expected to eventually cover roughly 360,000 Navy and Marine 
Corps users.  The five-year base period, covering fiscal years 2001 through 2005, has a 
maximum value of $4.1 billion.  A subsequent three-year option period, covering fiscal 
years 2006 through 2008, has a maximum value of $2.8 billion.  Therefore, the contract 
maximum value (if the option period is exercised) totals $6.9 billion.  [Ref. 6] 
NMCI actually takes the seat management concept one step further.  Traditional 
seat management approaches cover only desktop computing (i.e., networked PCs).   The 
EDS program executive for NMCI has been quoted describing NMCI as “an enterprise-
wide, managed service for voice, video, and data exchange.” [Ref. 7]  The “access 
devices” for NMCI include networked desktop PCs, laptops, portable and embarkable 
workstations, etc., with local- and wide-area connectivity.  Both classified and non-
classified connectivity are available.   NMCI provides the use of the access devices, help 
desk support, network operations centers, and all necessary processes and technologies 
included in the seat pricing.   
Notwithstanding the inclusion of laptops, portable workstations, and even voice 
seats (phones), the largest component of NMCI is the networked desktop workstations as 
would be found in a traditional seat management contract.  The desktop workstations 
have been the first services rolled out under NMCI and the focus of test and evaluation 
processes as Congressional approval has been sought for further rollout funding. 
Detailed descriptions of various aspects of the NMCI contract, and of related 
NMCI program execution efforts, are provided in later chapters of this thesis.  
  
D. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF SEAT MANAGEMENT AND OF NMCI 
1. Cost Issues 
There are many possible benefits to be derived from seat management 
contracting.  However, lower costs may not necessarily be one of them.  In some early 
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instances, seat management appeared to offer large cost savings.  For instance, the cost 
per seat at one NASA facility under the early ODIN seat management program was 
projected to range from $2,000 to $3,400 annually when earlier studies had apparently 
shown the actual annual costs to the agency (prior to seat management) to average $8,000 
per seat. The large apparent savings were quickly criticized based on the assertion that 
the ODIN per-seat figures represented contract dollars divided by the number of seats.  
However, a portion of the seats called for by the contract did not represent full-service 
PCs, which understated the per seat projections.  [Ref. 8] 
A more realistic example might be the NMCI contract.  The original Business 
Case Analysis (BCA) for NMCI was conducted in FY00.  An update to the BCA was 
prepared for submission to Congress in December 2001.  The update reflected that the 
average "as is" cost per seat for first increment Navy sites was $3,851 and the new cost 
under NMCI would compute to $3,412 [Ref. 9].  This represented an apparent savings of 
11%, which while impressive, is not the huge savings some earlier seat management 
proponents tried to portray.  When the maximum incentive of $400 per seat is factored 
into the per-seat costs, the NMCI figure could increase to $3,812, which would only be 
one percent less than the average "as is" seat cost. 
While there have been success stories in the private sector where outsourcing IT 
resources have produced cost savings, there are several constraints that prevent the 
Government from realizing similar savings.  Industry has tax incentives, investment 
write-offs, and business related savings not available to the Government; and industry has 
less oversight requirements and less difficulty when it comes to reducing organic 
workforces [Ref 10].  These reasons make it less likely that the Government would 
achieve noticeable cost savings from seat management contracting in comparison to the 
commercial world. 
While lower costs are not necessarily an outcome of seat management 
contracting, it would appear that at least the costs are not higher.  However, this is not 
really the case.  When a sizeable seat management contract is awarded, there are direct 
(and indirect) costs associated with managing the contract.  It can cost between five and 
seven percent of the contract value to manage and oversee the contract [Ref. 10].   In the 
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NMCI example, this could eliminate any cost savings if the contractor earns only one-
half of the maximum per-seat incentive.   
Considering the massive organization that the Navy has established to manage 
NMCI, the five to seven percent estimate may, in fact, be conservative.  The NMCI 
management organization as it was initially designed included participation from the 
offices of the Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer (DoN CIO), Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO), and Commandant of the Marine Corps, along with the Program 
Executive Officer for IT (PEO-IT), two program management offices (PMOs) [one for 
the Navy and one for the Marine Corps], an Executive Council, a Stakeholders Council, 
Enterprise Action Groups, and operational control under the Commander Task Force 
(CTF) NMCI which was led by a Flag officer [Ref. 11].  (This elaborate management 
structure was streamlined somewhat in early 2002 when the Navy appointed a single 
admiral to manage the project in a streamlined authority structure [Ref. 12].)   
In addition to the high-level management structure described above (both before 
and after the streamlining), the contract is administered by a Procuring Contracting 
Officer (PCO) organization, an Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) organization 
[which includes a Lead ACO office and more than twenty Local ACOs], a dozen 
Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs), numerous Customer Technical 
Representatives (CTRs), and several Customer Advocates (CAs).  The large organization 
established to manage and oversee the NMCI contract represents additional costs to the 
Government beyond the face value of the services ordered under the contract. 
2. Technical Issues 
Although lower cost is not necessarily a benefit of seat management contracting 
approaches, there are nevertheless some distinct and tangible advantages.  While GSA 
has admitted that "those who think you go to outsourcing or seat [management] simply to 
save money are missing the boat [Ref. 13]," William N. Washington, writing in the 
Spring 1999 issue of Acquisition Review Quarterly, indicates that "most gains with 
outsourcing [of IT] have been quality improvement."  [Ref. 10]   
With proper structuring of the requirements and the contract, commercial 
expertise and best practices can be leveraged to result in better response time, more 
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reliable system availability, reduced downtime, etc.  The structuring of the requirements 
and contract can lead to some of the key challenges with this method of contracting (such 
as benchmarking technical performance requirements, establishing effective performance 
measures, identifying effective incentives, etc.).  These challenges are explored in later 
chapters of this thesis.  Only by effectively solving these and other potential challenges 
can any quality improvement benefits be obtained.   
Another way of looking at the potential benefits of seat management is from the 
perspective of enterprise management.  One Government official indicated that by using 
seat management, "we hope to save money.  But that is not our primary driver.  It's 
enterprise management." [Ref. 13]  Once fully implemented, the NMCI contract will 
consolidate Navy and Marine Corps networks at over 300 military bases into a single, 
enterprise-wide managed service.  [Ref. 9]  Benefits derived from an enterprise-wide 
approach include improved interoperability and access (as enterprise-wide approaches 
often replace numerous smaller networks), more visibility of IT costs, and other 
possibilities. 
There can be collateral savings as a result of an enterprise-wide approach to 
implementing seat management.  Making the transition to a common operating system 
and common operating environment can lead to real savings in logistics and software 
support, while increasing the ability of those within the enterprise to collaborate using 
common sets of software.  One way of achieving the savings in software support is to 
streamline the number of applications being used to only those that are truly necessary 
and/or those that can be used across the enterprise.  Across the Navy and Marine Corps, 
3955 separate applications were identified and, of those, 1915 were eliminated.  [Ref. 14] 
The ability to collaborate using an enterprise-wide network and common software 
applications can have tremendous benefits beyond savings in logistics and support.  In the 
case of the NMCI contract, Admiral Robert Natter, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, 
noted that "it allows us to maintain a technological advantage over any potential enemy."  
An NMCI Executive White Paper Progress Report dated August 22, 2001, stated that 
"NMCI has everything to do with warfighting… the Navy becomes a complete fighting 
unit from the front of the battle line all the way back to the furthest reaches of our 
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warehouses and laboratories."  This is because immediate information can be exchanged 
between the warfighters in the field and the shore-based support structures.  It is also 
worth noting that in the NMCI case, sixteen server farms will be put in place with the 
servers operating at only 50 percent capacity - leaving 50 percent available in case of 
war, resulting in enhanced lines of communication, improved quality of service, and 
better reach-back capability.  [Ref. 9] 
Another benefit of a seat management contract (especially when combined with 
an enterprise management perspective) is improved security.  When consolidating 
networks, multiple access points are eliminated reducing points of vulnerability in the 
system [Ref. 9].  The NMCI contract was particularly designed to include stringent 
information assurance requirements and to implement a level of security management 
that the Navy and Marine Corps had not previously experienced [Ref. 14].  Considering 
its military application, the NMCI contract "implements the Defense in Depth approach 
at all levels by rigorous implementation of firewalls, content scanners, intrusion detection 
systems and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)." [Ref. 9] 
"Technology refreshment" is another advantage of seat management contracting.  
Technology refreshment has been defined as the periodic replacement of commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) components such as processors, displays, operating systems, software, 
etc., to support the continued operation of the system through an indefinite service life.  
Technology refreshment is a way to extend the useful life of the IT resources while 
keeping up with technological advances.  Such planned upgrades not only ensure that 
systems stay current with the latest commercial technology, they also allow the 
organization to stay ahead of the "obsolescence curve." [Ref. 15]   
In the information technology arena, advances have been coming so quickly that 
it is a huge burden on an organization to plan (and budget) for upgrades in the traditional 
fashion.  By incorporating a technology refreshment requirement into a seat management 
contract, the vendor becomes responsible for planning and implementing the upgrades 
with no additional costs beyond the already known seat pricing.  The NMCI contract, for 
example, contains technology refreshment requirements that software is updated annually 
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or to maintain one revision from the current state, while hardware is updated every three 
years [Ref. 7].   
Even when the seat management contract does not specifically require technology 
refreshment, vendors are motivated to insert the latest technology anyway because the 
latest equipment is easier to maintain than older systems [Ref. 1].  Ultimately, though, 
this likely comes down to an economic decision.  The vendor would simply decide which 
strategy reduced its costs (and maximized its profits) - either continuing to maintain 
outdated systems or performing the upgrades. 
Another benefit of seat management contracting is the ability to free up personnel 
resources that had previously been performing routine tasks associated with the desktop 
IT resources (e.g., such as helpdesk personnel).  By transferring the ownership and 
responsibility for the resources to commercial vendors who specialize in IT support, 
employees can focus on an agency's core mission rather than running the desktop systems 
[Ref. 16].  This is particularly important in the military realm where one of the stated 
purposes of the NMCI contract is to allow Federal employees to be refocused on core 
Naval missions [Ref. 9].   
This benefit of seat management contracting is even more important in today's 
climate where the Government is finding it more difficult to compete with the private 
sector for IT personnel.  By freeing agency personnel from the day-to-day routine support 
tasks, they can perform other, potentially more interesting work and more business-
sensitive tasks [Ref. 17].  Meaningful work may help to retain critical IT professionals 
within the Government. 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter discussed seat management contracting as a method of acquiring IT 
resources, specifically desktop computing capability.  In addition to defining seat 
management contracting, the chapter also provided an overview of the NMCI contract.  
The chapter concluded with an examination of the benefits of seat management 
contracting in general along with a discussion of the expected benefits of NMCI. 
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 The next chapter provides a detailed examination of the challenges and concerns 
associated with the seat management method of contracting.  These challenges involve 
benchmarking technical performance requirements, establishing effective performance 
measures, creating effective incentives, preparing for the transition to seat management, 























III. CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH SEAT MANAGEMENT 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses challenges associated with the seat management method of 
IT contracting.  With proper structuring of the requirements and the contract, commercial 
expertise and best practices are leveraged to result in better response time, more reliable 
system availability, reduced downtime, etc.  The structuring of the requirements and 
contract can lead to some of the key challenges with this method of contracting.   
Significant challenges that must be effectively addressed involve benchmarking 
technical requirements, establishing effective performance measures, creating effective 
incentives, preparing for the transition to seat management, and managing the required 
culture change.  It is important to note, however, that these challenges are not unique to 
seat management contracting.  Some of these challenges are common to performance-
based service contracting in general, other IT outsourcing efforts, and/or various other 
acquisition initiatives. 
This chapter explores these five challenges in detail from a seat management 
perspective in order to lay the foundation for the next chapter, Chapter IV, which 
provides an analysis of the NMCI program's approach to addressing the challenges.   
 
B. BENCHMARKING TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 
1.  The Issue 
A significant challenge with IT contracting in general, and seat management 
contracting specifically, is how to define the technical requirements of the contract in an 
environment of constant change.  Government contracts routinely last 60 months (five 
years) when option years are included, and can even last for longer periods when 
procedures such as multi-year or award term contracting are utilized.  In the private 
sector, long-term relationships (lasting more than five years) are quite common in 
contracts and outsourcing arrangements.     
In the IT arena, periods of five years or longer can bring dramatic advances in 
technology.  In the past 20 years, advances in computer technology, data processing 
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speed, and computer acceptance have been dramatic.  Combined with this has been the 
evolution of the telecommunications industry.  For a century, the telephone and its 
network existed for person-to-person voice communication.  However, developments 
such as fax machines, wireless networks, and the Internet have significantly altered the 
telecommunications environment.  These changes, combined with the advances in 
computer technology, have merged these two industries.  Today, data has surpassed voice 
as the primary content carried by the telecommunications network.  [Ref. 18] 
It is a daunting challenge to define the technical requirements of a seat 
management contract (or any IT contract) in an environment of rapid technological 
changes.  For example, as shown in Figure 1, personal computer (PC) processing speeds 




Figure 1.  PC Speed Increases during the 1990s.  [From: Ref. 18] 
 
Specifically, Moore's Law observed an "exponential growth in the number of 
transistors per integrated circuit" and predicted that such growth would continue [Ref. 
19].  Gordon Moore is Chairman Emeritus of Intel Corporation, a leading producer of PC 
processors.  Figure 2 shows a different depiction of Moore's Law in terms of transistor 
quantity and Intel brand processors over a 30-year period. 
    
17 
 
Figure 2.  Intel Brand Processors and Transistor Increases.  [From: Ref. 19] 
 
Moore's Law, as evidenced by the rapid advances in PC processor speeds, is one 
example of the constantly changing environment in which contract technical 
requirements must be defined.  Another example is network bandwidth, which has 
increased by 36 percent per year over the past five years.  By 2005, bandwidth is 
expected to have increased ten-fold over 1998 levels.  Fueling the demand for increased 
bandwidth is the popularity and value of the Internet.  The Internet has revolutionized the 
way we communicate, the way data is transferred, and even the way business is 
conducted.  [Ref. 18]   
The rapidly changing technological environment poses a significant challenge to 
defining the technical requirements of a seat management contract, particularly a contract 
that may last for many years. 
2.  Addressing the Issue 
In a traditional IT contract (such as the procurement of 100 PCs), it would be 
logical to set forth exact specifications for the equipment to be purchased (e.g., Pentium 
IV processor, 256 megabyte memory, 40 gigabyte disk drive, etc.).  However, this is 
clearly not a prudent way to define the technical requirements of the desktop 
workstations to be obtained under a long-term seat management contract.  The natural 
technology advances in the environment would make such firm specifications outdated 
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rather quickly.  The need would then arise for administratively burdensome, and possibly 
costly, contract modifications to frequently update the technical specifications. 
It has been noted that when defining the technical requirements of the IT 
resources to be obtained, it is not practical to set "absolute standards for performance in 
an environment of continual change." A common alternative to specifying firm technical 
requirements is benchmarking.  A benchmark is defined as a minimum industry-based 
standard that must be met and serves to take into account changes in technology.  Setting 
benchmarks for the technical requirements not only accommodates technology advances, 
but also allows for monitoring contractor compliance with the requirements to keep up 
with those changes.  [Ref. 20] 
In an IT requirement, there are several things that can be benchmarked.  For 
example, benchmarks can be applied to an enterprise system, a specific subsystem (such 
as processors, memory, or disks), a particular application (such as a word processor or 
spreadsheet program), and/or to a server-based application (such as a database or web 
browser).  [Ref. 21] 
 Once a decision is made as to what will be benchmarked, the next step is to 
determine an appropriate industry-based benchmark to reference.  To be effective, the 
selected benchmark must be simple, consistent, relevant to the end-user requirements, 
and clearly understood by all parties [Ref. 20].  Benchmarks can be specific or generic.  
An example of specific benchmarks includes those established by an industry-recognized 
source such as the Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC).  SPEC is a 
non-profit corporation whose purpose is to "establish, maintain and endorse a 
standardized set of relevant benchmarks" to measure computer performance [Ref. 22].  
SPEC has developed a variety of component- and system-level benchmarks for 
workstations and multi-use servers. 
 A simpler approach is to use a generic benchmark.  One generic benchmark that 
aims to keep up with technology changes has been dubbed "state-of-the-shelf."  This term 
has been coined to identify the best technology that is currently (and sufficiently) 
available in the marketplace.  When a new technology is developed, it begins as "state-of-
the-art."  At this point it is usually not widely available, it is expensive compared to other 
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available solutions, and it may be difficult and costly to implement as a result of being 
incompatible with interrelated products.  (State-of-the-art technology is also risky to 
implement, as the marketplace may not ultimately adopt the technology.)  After a period 
of time, as state-of-the-art technology becomes more widely available, more affordable, 
and more readily implemented, it transitions to being state-of-the-shelf.  After more time 
passes, the technology becomes "mainstream" as the price drops further and the 
technology is widely adopted by users.  Eventually, it becomes "value" technology as it 
moves toward being outdated and newer products move from state-of-the-shelf to 
become mainstream.  [Ref. 23]        
 Using a state-of-the-shelf benchmark recognizes a commercial best practice 
balancing of technology, usability, stability, and value.  It has been noted that state-of-
the-art is technically feasible, while state-of-the-shelf is technically useable.  Using a 
generic benchmark that references the state of the shelf is a practical solution that 
"transitions technology gains into the contract at a consistent value" trading off price 
versus performance.  [Ref. 23]   
 Of course, using a generic benchmark such as state-of-the-shelf to meet the 
challenge of defining technical requirements in a constantly changing environment is not 
without its own challenges.  Just like the technological environment in general, the state-
of-the-shelf is also a "moving target" that changes frequently.  The challenge is to 
establish how often the benchmark is revisited and how frequently the technology 
provided under the seat management (or any IT) contract is updated.  This relates to not 
only the initial technology provided, but also to periodic technology refreshment.  
("Technology insertion" is a term that encompasses both the initial provision and the 
ongoing refreshment of the technology.)  Another challenge is obtaining a clear and 
unambiguous (and undisputed) definition of the state-of-the-shelf technology at the 
specific times that the contractor provides the technology insertion. 
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C. EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 1.  The Issue 
 A challenge inherent in performance based service contracting (including seat 
management contracts) is defining the minimum acceptable performance standards and 
establishing a performance monitoring approach to determine whether or not the required 
performance standards are met.  "Performance management" is a term used to encompass 
these tasks, and is defined broadly as "the activities and processes needed to determine if 
the contract is being satisfactorily executed."  [Ref. 24]  More specifically, performance 
management is the process of monitoring vendor performance against the contractual 
requirements. 
 Performance management can be both strategic and tactical.  Strategic 
performance management is concerned with the broader goals of the program, such as 
program-wide cost, schedule, and technical performance goals.  In Government 
programs, a strategic concern could also involve whether or not the contract is attaining 
public policy goals.  Tactical performance management, on the other hand, is concerned 
with the vendor's performance against the specific individual services required by the 
contract and assessing cost, schedule, or technical performances on those individual 
services.  Tactical performance management, therefore, is often dubbed "service level 
performance management." [Ref. 24] 
 Performance measures can be both quantitative and qualitative.  Most 
performance metrics, of course, are quantitative.  By definition, performance measures 
should be specific, objective and verifiable so that there are no disputes over whether or 
not contractually required standards have been met.  However, there is a strong argument 
that qualitative measures are also important.  For instance, in some cases, quantitative 
measures simply do not exist to fully capture a performance measure that is important 
from either a strategic or a tactical perspective.  An example is customer satisfaction.  In 
other cases, qualitative data can "support and enhance" the quantitative measures by 
providing "depth and meaning" to the numbers.  For instance, quantitative data can show 
poor performance but does not tell why the poor performance occurred or what impact it 
had.  [Ref. 20]      
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 In addition to the strategic vs. tactical, and quantitative vs. qualitative 
considerations, there are other principles that should be considered in establishing 
effective performance measures.  For example, performance measures should be related 
to an end result rather than a specific process wherever possible, defined in specific terms 
and language that prevents multiple interpretations, sufficiently standard to allow for 
comparison of the vendor's performance against other vendors on similar efforts, and 
encompass all elements of desired performance.  [Ref. 25] 
 In addition, performance measures should include only items that are clearly (and 
solely) under the control of the vendor in order to prevent disputes over responsibility for 
poor performance.  It is often beneficial to tie incentives and/or penalties to the 
performance measures to emphasize their importance and to motivate the vendor to not 
only meet expectations, but to exceed them.  If incentives and/or penalties are tied to the 
performance measures, it is important to define "mutually exclusive indicators" so that 
the vendor is not rewarded (or penalized) more than once for the same performance, 
unless it is specifically desirable to emphasize a particular performance aspect.  Finally, 
historical records should be maintained in order to track performance trends over time.  
[Ref. 25] 
 2.  Addressing the Issue 
 Many IT contracts, including seat management arrangements, include 
performance measures rooted in the tactical performance management concept of service 
levels (although strategic concerns can also be included).  Such service level performance 
management is usually defined and managed through the use of "service level 
agreements" or SLAs. 
 A SLA is defined as a "contracting tool keyed to the customer's expectations" in 
that customers and vendors agree up front which services and performance levels will be 
provided and how success or failure will be measured [Ref. 26].   Essentially, a SLA is a 
contractual commitment to meet specific service goals, along with the methods to 
monitor performance.  Similar to performance measures in general, the advantages to 
using SLAs include giving both the customer and the vendor a baseline to measure 
performance, and enabling payments (via incentives and/or penalties) to be tied to 
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performance, service quality, and customer satisfaction.  The disadvantages include 
difficulty in getting disparate user groups to agree on specific performance requirements 
and measures, the potential to pay for higher levels of service than are actually needed for 
some users, and a perceived lack of control.  [Ref. 27] 
A good seat management contract should include an adequate number of SLAs to 
help determine whether or not the contractor is meeting the goals and performance 
standards of the program.  While a variety of measures can be used, basic ones should 
cover such items as vendor response time, system availability, and downtime [Ref. 10].  
A survey conducted in August 2000 found that the top factors contributing to end user 
satisfaction were meeting availability requirements, having a stable or improving 
availability trend, meeting other performance requirements, and having short recovery 
times from unplanned outages [Ref. 28].   
 A SLA related to network availability would typically require that a specific 
percentage of network "uptime" be met.  Other criteria could include network 
performance, network reliability (measured over time), mean time to report a failure, 
message delivery time, trouble tickets responded to, time to complete equipment moves, 
or even user training.  [Ref. 27] 
 To be effective, SLAs should be developed with a focus on such areas as 
completeness, reporting functions, change management, and consistency [Ref. 29].   
Completeness refers to outlining all of the functions that are monitored.  
However, a common mistake is specifying too many SLAs.  Just because the Statement 
of Work (SOW) or Performance Work Statement (PWS) requires a specific service, does 
not necessarily require that a SLA be dedicated to it.  The objective of the contract is to 
send the vendor a clear message about the requirements critical to the customer's success.  
This objective can be met by grouping the services into a relatively small number of 
SLAs and invoking incentives and/or penalties on those few measures that are truly 
critical to the customer's success.  [Ref. 24]  
 Completeness can also refer to defining service level objectives, those specific 
aspects of each service level that will be monitored.  Typically, service level objectives 
include such things as availability, performance, and accuracy.  Availability can be 
23 
measured in units of time (such as hours) or as a percentage as noted previously.  
Performance can be measured in terms of volume of transactions accomplished or speed.  
Accuracy can be measured by whether or not the service accomplishes what was 
intended.  [Ref. 30] 
 It is also important within each SLA to limit the required aspects to be monitored 
to only those that are truly critical.  It has been noted that "the more comprehensive the 
SLA, the higher the cost of the service."  [Ref. 31]  Of course, the more aspects to the 
SLA (or the more SLAs overall), the higher the costs to the customer become for 
monitoring performance. 
 Reporting functions include reports that are used to judge performance, how 
frequently they are generated, and who will receive them [Ref. 29].  The two categories 
of reporting for SLAs are real time reporting and periodic reporting.  The purpose of real 
time reporting is to allow clients to know the status (or "health") of the service.  A simple 
confirmation that the service is functioning normally is usually sufficient.  When 
problems occur, the customer should be promptly notified of the nature of the problem, 
its scope and impact, and the planned resolution.  Periodic reporting (the type specified in 
most SLAs) refers to mostly historical metrics on actual service performance that can 
then be compared to the contract requirements.  [Ref. 32] 
 Change management refers to the fact that large IT networks are dynamic entities.  
Applications, devices, and users are frequently added or subtracted.  Hardware and 
software are frequently refreshed.  The SLAs should outline how the impact of such 
changes will be accommodated in the performance requirements and performance 
measurement.  Consistency refers to the fact that SLAs tend to be complex and lengthy, 
so they should be written to ensure that common terms (such as response time) are used 
in a consistent manner both within and across SLAs.  [Ref. 29] 
 In addition to the basic SLA guidance above, the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) has identified some commercial best practices that should be considered by the 
Government when outsourcing large IT efforts.  For example, SLAs should include 
measures that reflect end-user satisfaction as well as technical IT performance, which 
dovetails with the concept of including qualitative measures along with quantitative 
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measures that was discussed previously in this section.  Another best practice is to ensure 
that the SLAs are designed so that the vendor is required to achieve escalating 
performance standards at agreed-upon intervals.  It was also recommended that SLAs 
incorporate sufficient flexibility so that minimum acceptable levels of performance can 
be adjusted as conditions change, as the provider becomes more adept at satisfying 
customer needs, and as improvement goals are achieved.  Similarly, GAO also 
recommended that SLAs be reviewed and updated periodically.  These last two items 
could be included in the change management concept discussed previously.  [Ref. 33] 
 Some additional recommendations from GAO include periodically undertaking 
studies to compare the vendor's performance metrics to similar efforts, conducting 
executive-level meetings with the vendor's senior management to review the vendor's 
performance, distributing the performance data to key stakeholders, reserving audit rights 
on performance data supplied by the vendor, and performing trend analysis.  [Ref. 33] 
 In early 2002, GAO released a review of six agencies and their use of seat 
management contracts.  In the area of performance measures, GAO reported several 
negative findings.  For example, it was noted that seat management contracts "sometimes 
did not include contractor performance measures pertaining to all business goals" of the 
program.  One agency was cited for having performance goals in its agency strategic plan 
to cut costs and improve productivity, while the seat management performance measures 
did not include metrics for cost reductions or productivity improvements.  (The agency's 
seat management contract was part of the agency's plan to meet its strategic goals.)  [Ref. 
34] 
 Another agency's seat management contract was cited for having performance 
metrics that were "inadequate, incomplete, and/or [insufficient] incentive to the 
contractor."  Other agencies' performance measures were described as "complex and 
cumbersome," and "not adequate to ensure acceptable service performance and adequate 
capacity for service growth."  [Ref. 34]  
 It is clear that establishing the performance measures (in terms of SLAs) for a seat 
management contract (or any IT outsourcing effort) is a daunting task.  This is probably 
the most critical challenge associated with seat management contracting.   
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D. INCENTIVES 
 1.  The Issue 
Another challenge inherent in performance based service contracting (including 
seat management contracts) is identifying and establishing effective incentives.  Creating 
effective incentives is strongly related to performance management strategies and the use 
of effective performance measures as discussed in the preceding section.  Incentives can 
stand alone or can be combined with penalties for a "carrot and stick" approach to 
motivating contractor performance.  
When applying commercial best practices to IT outsourcing efforts, one common 
approach is the use of "total cost of ownership" or TCO.  The TCO concept is a "method 
used to define and measure the total cost of acquiring and maintaining a desktop 
computing environment."  [Ref. 35]  A TCO computation would include the costs of 
hardware, software, support services, maintenance, etc. (essentially everything covered 
by a seat management arrangement), as well as indirect costs such as lost productivity 
due to downtime.  Early seat management efforts tried to incentivize reductions in TCO.  
However, the role of IT investments (at least in the private sector) has become more 
strategic in nature and blindly incentivizing reductions in TCO could be at odds with 
overall business objectives [Ref. 35].  Of course, as noted in Chapter II, early seat 
management pioneers quickly realized that cost reductions were not a typical benefit of 
seat management contracting.   
 Another drawback to a TCO approach to incentivizing contractor performance is 
the fact that it is hard to tell if money is being saved without accurate numbers going into 
the contract [Ref. 36].  Ideally, TCO should be used as part of the decision to migrate to a 
seat management contract in the first place, as well as to justify further investments in the 
arrangement.  The 1996 Clinger-Cohen Act, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Circular A-130, and GAO IT investment management guidance all call for IT managers 
to study their investments in IT efforts.  However, GAO's review of six agencies and their 
use of seat management contracts noted that all six did not sufficiently analyze their 
baseline and projected costs before implementing seat management [Ref. 34].  It is not 
feasible to base incentives on TCO reductions without accurate baseline data.   
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While it seems clear that TCO is generally not a good method to incentivize 
contractor performance on seat management contracts, the challenge remains to create 
meaningful incentives to motivate contractor performance, encourage innovation, and 
stimulate continuous improvement.   
2.  Addressing the Issue 
The most common approaches to incentives in seat management efforts tie the 
incentives (and often penalties, as well) to the performance measures defined in the 
SLAs.  A key goal in establishing meaningful incentives should be to coordinate them 
with the contract's SLAs to encourage the contractor to continually improve its systems, 
with incentives being earned if the required levels of service are surpassed [Ref. 20].  A 
typical approach is to establish monetary incentives (and penalties, if applicable) for each 
of the SLAs and apply those in a performance requirement summary (PRS) type of 
format.  Table 1 is an illustration of a simplified PRS chart for a seat management 
contract. 
A method for tracking the net result of applying monetary incentives and penalties 
is the use of "retainage pools" in which a set percentage (as defined in the contract) of the 
contractor's monthly payment is set aside (retained) by the Government and disbursed 
periodically after a review of contractor performance [Ref. 34].  For example, in NASA's 
ODIN contract, the agency uses both a "performance retainage pool" (three percent of the 
sum of monthly seat prices tied to successful implementation of the ODIN operating 
model) and a "metric performance retainage pool" (one percent of the sum of monthly 
seat prices tied to service delivery, availability, and customer satisfaction) [Ref. 37].  
Another method would be to establish a maximum incentive amount available to the 
contractor (similar to an award fee provision) that is offset by any penalties assessed. 
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PERFORMANCE BASED CONTRACTING TEMPLATE - SEAT 
MANAGEMENT 
Desired Outcomes Required Service Performance 
Standard 
Monitoring Method Incentives/ 
Disincentives  
1) Users shall have 
access to all desktop 
computing functions, as 
needed. 
Desktop systems/ 
networks shall be 
available to all users  
M-F, 6a.m.till10p.m. 
99% availability, as 
described herein. 
 
Inspect call logs for 
trouble calls. 
 






numbers of staff 
members are available 
to resolve day-to-day 
issues. 
The Contractor shall 
provide qualified 
employees to 
adequately staff the 
program. 
Average staffing levels 
shall not fall below 
90% on any task order. 
 
Invoices, reports, and 
other records will be 
reviewed to determine 
staffing levels on a 
monthly basis.  
+/- 0.5% of total task 
order price, for each 
variance +/-5% (reflects 
positive and negative 
incentive) from 
standard. 
3) Moves, adds, and 




Requests for moves, 
adds, and/or changes 
shall be completed 
within 5 workdays after 
receipt of request. 
98% of requests are 
completed within 5 
workdays. 
 
Random sampling of 
request for service (i.e., 
RISS) logs, completed 
work tickets, and 
customer interviews.  
+/- 1% of total monthly 
price for each +/-1% 
variance from standard. 
 
4) Customer 
problems shall be 
resolved as quickly and 
efficiently as 
possible.  
Requests for service 
shall be efficiently 
logged and tracked, and 
the customer shall be 
notified as to expected 
completion time. 
98% of calls are 




system will be 
reviewed, noting how 
request arrived (e-mail, 
phone), time arrived, 
and completion. 
+/- 1% of total monthly 
price for each variance 




response and repair 




For L1 customers, 
system/network 
services shall be 
restored within 2 hours 
of receipt of 
notification; for L2 
customers, service 
shall be restored 
within 4 hours. 
98% of service 
equipment is 
restored to service 




system will be 
reviewed, noting time 
arrived, and date/time 
completed; random 
sampling of customers. 
 
+/- 1% of total monthly 
price for each variance 





Table 1.  PRS Example.  [From: http://knownet.hhs.gov/acquisition] 
 
Incentives and performance measures should be implemented in a coordinated 
fashion to emphasize the goals that are important to the organization's (or agency's) 
mission.  GAO has noted that recent reforms (including the Clinger-Cohen Act, the  
Government Performance and Results Act, and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act) 
have emphasized a "results-oriented approach toward IT."  [Ref. 38]     
Specifically, the Clinger-Cohen Act emphasizes a goal that IT projects contribute 
to "tangible, observable improvements in mission performance."  Successfully acquiring 
and applying IT has been described as "central to improving Government operations and 
generating better service to the American people." [Ref. 38] 
The GAO Executive Guide to Improving Mission Performance Through Strategic 
Information Management and Technology indicates that IT projects should be 
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implemented with an eye toward measurable benefits (to the organization) such as 
increased productivity, improved customer service, higher returns on IT investments, and 
lower risks of failure, delay, and overspending [Ref. 39].  Similarly, the GAO Executive 
Guide to Maximizing the Success of Chief Information Officers provides that the role of 
IT in creating value is based upon IT's impact on the overall strategic mission of the 
organization [Ref. 40].   
Therefore, the incentives and performance measures should be implemented in a 
coordinated fashion to improve the ability of the organization to meet its overall strategic 
goals.  Failure to consider the organization's "purpose in life" can bring failure in the 
private sector, while in the Government it can bring stinging criticism.  For example, 
GAO criticized the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for wasting millions of 
dollars on poorly managed IT investments "without determining how to best deliver 
services to its customers." [Ref. 41] 
There is some evidence that agencies are taking this advice to heart in considering 
seat management incentives.  For example, a recent study of the NASA ODIN contract 
included the findings that:  (1) innovation incentives are lacking; and (2) metrics are 
generally ineffective.  Recommendations of the study included the creation of incentives 
that reward both innovation and exceptional performance in meeting metrics that track 
progress against strategic objectives [Ref. 42]. 
In designing the seat management incentives with the organization's overall 
mission in mind, it is important to consider the mission or goals of the organization at a 
macro level (i.e., an enterprise-wide view).  It would be detrimental to focus only on the 
goals of one segment of the organization as the new IT strategy might improve 
functioning in one area to the detriment of other areas.  A recent GAO report criticized 
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for implementing an IT solution focused on only 
one of its six business areas.  Specifically, GAO commented that DLA's plans would 
increase "the risk that DLA will modernize in a way that optimizes an individual business 
area but does not optimize agencywide…performance and accountability."  [Ref. 43]   
In addition to basic performance incentives (tied to the SLAs) and consideration 
of the strategic goals of the organization, another key consideration in designing seat 
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management incentives is customer satisfaction.  Customer feelings and attitudes are 
critical to the success of any program, although they are particularly important in a seat 
management effort due to the radical nature of the transition to buying IT capabilities like 
a utility service.  In fact, GAO has identified pursuing "improvement based on customer 
satisfaction surveys" as a commercial best practice for IT outsourcing [Ref. 33]. 
To gauge customer service, "self reporting" (by the customers) is the most 
common, least expensive, and most objective method.  Customer satisfaction surveys are 
common in many industries and customer attitudes are typically measured using a variety 
of numerical scales.  Responses can then be counted, frequency of satisfaction measured, 
and various percentages derived.  When tying seat management incentives to customer 
service, however, there are two risks to using only numerical scales.  First, assigning a 
number to an adjectival rating can be problematic since the meaning of "very satisfied," 
for instance, can vary from individual to individual.  While it is possible to say what 
percentage of customers chose that answer on a survey, it does not provide a significant 
level of understanding.  Therefore, qualitative measures should be used to supplement 
quantitative analysis of customer satisfaction.  The second risk with customer satisfaction 
surveys is that they may not ask the right questions.  Focus groups or other methods can 
assess what customers really want from the program.  [Ref. 20] 
In addition to creating incentives that are tied to the performance measures 
(SLAs), to the overall strategic goals of the organization, and to customer service, they 
can also be designed in relation to other things.  For example, incentives can be tied to 
the transition period.  Implementing seat management is often a complex undertaking that 
can meet with cultural resistance and other barriers.  In early 2002, GAO released a 
review of six agencies and their use of seat management contracts.  One recommendation 
was that agencies consider incentives related to the transition period.  In GAO's review, 
officials from one agency that did not include transition incentives was quoted as stating 
that they wished that they had [Ref. 34].  As another example, Government contracts 
often apply incentives to socio-economic issues (such as small and small disadvantaged 
business subcontracting). 
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In a "carrot and stick" approach, penalties are the reverse of incentives.  As noted 
previously, seat management contracts often include both.  Similar to incentives, there 
are some key considerations in creating effective penalty provisions.   GAO has identified 
several commercial best practices for designing penalties in IT outsourcing efforts.  For 
example, penalties can be assessed for failure to meet individual SLAs as well as 
aggregate performance requirements, penalties can be in the form of credits to the 
customer, penalties can increase for recurring poor performance, penalties can be 
refunded if agreed-upon performance levels are restored quickly, and penalties can be 
designed to withhold contractor profit, but not cost [Ref. 33]. 
Creating meaningful incentives (in a coordinated fashion with effective 
performance measures) is a key challenge of seat management contracting.  As with other 
types of contracting, properly structured incentives (and penalties if applicable) can be 
quite valuable in encouraging contractor efforts to meet and exceed expectations. 
 
E. PREPARING FOR THE TRANSITION TO SEAT MANAGEMENT 
1.  The Issue 
A challenge inherent in large IT outsourcing efforts (including seat management 
contracts) is preparing for, and facilitating, the actual transition to the new way of 
acquiring the services.  There are two basic areas that must be addressed in transition 
planning.  The first is the transition of the actual IT assets and services themselves (i.e., 
the "IT environment"), and the second is the transition of any displaced human capital as 
a result of the outsourcing. 
The launching of a seat management approach to IT involves a complex transition 
that requires, among other things, management of "distributed assets" (including those 
outside the immediate organization) and might also influence local or regional 
information centers [Ref. 44].  Seat management usually involves turning over ownership 
of the existing IT assets to the new vendor.  In addition to the existing desktop computers, 
these assets may include support assets such as servers, routers, and even cabling. 
In the military environment, this can affect not only one office's computer 
equipment but also the servers, routers, etc., that may be located elsewhere on the 
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military base or compound.  Sometimes this is further complicated when an office of one 
service (e.g., an Army activity) is sitting on another service's installation (e.g., a Navy 
Base) and the transitioning activity had been sharing the other service's local IT 
infrastructure.  Further complicating this transition of IT resources is the fact that often 
some equipment is being leased and is not owned by the transitioning activity.  In this 
case, the lease expiration must be coordinated with the seat management contractor's 
responsibility to install new equipment.  In addition to hardware, software is also a 
concern and existing software licenses must be located, documented, and transferred. 
Of course, the current IT environment includes more than just the hardware and 
software.  It is possible that certain services (such as equipment maintenance and/or help 
desk support) may be provided under existing contracts or may have been previously 
outsourced as a result of an OMB Circular A-76 study.  The transition planning must 
consider how all of these aspects (infrastructure, hardware, software, support services, 
etc.) will be converted to the new seat management endeavor.     
In addition to the transition of the IT environment, there is also the transition of 
excess human capital to consider.  As noted previously, one of the advantages of 
outsourcing the desktop IT resources is that employees who had previously dealt with the 
day-to-day support of those resources can be freed up for other more business-sensitive 
tasks.  In many cases, though, there will be excess employees that are no longer required 
by the organization after the seat management approach is implemented.  In the private 
sector, organizations may have to plan for layoffs with such considerations as severance 
packages, retraining, or placement assistance.  The Government has its own processes for 
eliminating unnecessary positions. 
Whether it is through formal transition planning or less formal means, it is 
important that the issues related to the transition from current support to the new seat 
management approach be identified, analyzed, and planned for.  Otherwise, a smooth 
transition will be nearly impossible. 
2.  Addressing the Issue 
GAO has recognized the need for effective planning in order to manage the 
transition to seat management.  In GAO's review of six agencies and their use of seat 
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management contracts, they identified "the transition period between awarding the 
contract and reaching a 'steady state'" as one of the most important areas of post-award 
planning.  In their review, GAO identified dealing with the existing infrastructure as a 
key issue during the transition period.  In fact, two of the agencies reviewed indicated 
that they should have allowed more time for the transition period.  The seat management 
contractor for one of the agencies cited ill-defined transition requirements that did not 
adequately plan for parallel operations with an incumbent contractor.  [Ref. 34] 
GAO has also identified several commercial best practices for transition planning 
in IT outsourcing efforts.  In addition to communicating a clear transition process to all 
key players from the customer and contractor organizations, they also recommend such 
practices as communicating what will happen (and when) to employees, establishing 
(customer) transition teams with representatives from across the organization, 
documenting key information to preserve organizational knowledge in the event the 
service provider changes, and using change management strategies.  [Ref. 33]   
With regard to seat management contracts specifically, some organizations have 
utilized an entity relationship agreement, or "ERA," to address issues associated with the 
migration from existing sources of operational support (such as leased PCs or contracted 
help desk support) to the new seat management contractor [Ref. 44].  Such agreements 
should address - in a site-specific fashion if multiple sites are involved - such items as 
roles and responsibilities of each party (Government and contractor) for the transition, 
pre- and post- transition activities, change management communication, software 
licenses, shared resources, security, facilities, and legacy system connectivity.  The use of 
such an agreement will let the customer maintain accountability for asset management 
and service delivery [Ref. 44]. 
The use of contractor transition managers or transition teams (where contractor 
personnel oversee the transition at the customer site) to smooth implementation efforts 
and deal with unforeseen challenges are another common commercial practice in 
transitioning to the seat management environment. 
In addition to the transition of services, there is also the issue of transition of 
excess human capital.  As noted previously, one of the advantages of outsourcing the 
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desktop IT resources is that employees who had previously dealt with the day-to-day 
support of those resources can be freed up for other more business-sensitive tasks.  In 
many cases, though, there will be excess employees that will no longer be required by the 
organization after the seat management approach is implemented.  In the private sector, 
organizations may have to plan for layoffs of excess employees.  The Government has its 
own processes for eliminating positions, such as reductions-in-force (RIFs) or OMB 
Circular A-76 studies, which can be cumbersome, complex, and time-consuming. 
One method of easing the transition of displaced Government employees has been 
to include a "right of first refusal" clause in the new contract.  A typical clause requires 
the contractor to give Government employees who have been (or will be) "adversely 
affected" by the contract the right of first refusal for employment with the contractor for 
positions the employees are qualified for (subject to post-Government employment 
restrictions) [Ref. 45].  Such clauses can be tailored to require the contractor to provide 
retraining where necessary.  
GAO has identified several commercial best practices for planning for the 
transition of excess staff in IT outsourcing efforts.  For example, their recommendations 
include encouraging transfer of staff to the contractor through the use of bonuses or other 
incentives, developing employee retention programs to keep key people, assisting 
employees who do not wish to transfer to the contractor in finding other jobs (within the 
organization or elsewhere), and using change management strategies [Ref. 33]. 
Whatever methods are used, it is important to consider the organization's people 
in a transition to seat management.  Change management procedures, especially 
communication, will go a long way toward reducing the anxiety and uncertainty during 
such a transition. 
It is clear that preparing for the transition to seat management is a complex task. 
In a military environment, transition problems can cause unacceptable risks as IT has 
become critical to supporting the warfighters.  However, effort spent up-front on 
thorough transition planning is likely to pay off in a smoother and more effective 
transition.   
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F. MANAGING CULTURE CHANGE 
1.  The Issue 
A significant challenge to implementing a seat management contracting approach 
is managing the organizational culture change that is required to successfully deploy this 
new method of obtaining desktop computing power.  "Culture" refers to "norms of 
behavior and shared values" among the members of an organization.  "Shared values" are 
the "important concerns and goals held by most people in the group" that, in turn, shape 
the norms of behavior within the organization.  [Ref. 46] 
Dealing with the required culture change is one of the most pervasive - and yet 
most difficult - challenges of seat management contracting, particularly in large 
organizations.  This method of IT contracting represents a significant change to the way 
desktop computing capability is acquired and managed.  Accordingly, some basic change 
management strategies are important to build understanding and commitment to the new 
approach.  The short-term goal of managing the necessary culture change is to build 
ownership of - and dedication to - the seat management approach, while the long-term 
goal is to successfully implement the new concept. 
There are two general "culture-change scenarios."  The first is where the "core of 
the old culture is incompatible with the new vision" and is very difficult to manage.  The 
second scenario - most common in seat management implementations - is where the 
"core of the old culture is not incompatible with the new vision."  This is an easier 
situation to manage and is described as one involving "grafting new practices onto old 
roots."  [Ref. 46] 
The second scenario is a good metaphor for a seat management implementation.  
Seat management dramatically changes the way in which the organization obtains and 
manages its desktop computing power - but usually does not fundamentally change what 
the organization does with that power (although seat management may allow for more 
collaboration capabilities than were previously available).  
Organizational culture, of course, cannot be directly manipulated and true culture 
change "comes at the end of a transformation" as opposed to the beginning [Ref. 46].  
However, it is important to take actions from the earliest point in planning for, and 
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implementing, seat management in order to promote the necessary culture change.  The 
key elements to effectively managing culture change in this context would include 
leadership, communication of organizational goals and vision, and surfacing (and 
addressing) resistance to the change to seat management.   
Effective communication with affected parties (e.g., stakeholders, program 
implementers, users, displaced employees, etc.) is the single most important tool to 
manage the necessary culture change.  Addressing the culture change issue in a seat 
management implementation has several aspects. 
2.  Addressing the Issue 
A key task in managing the required culture change is to ensure that all of the 
stakeholders are educated upfront that seat management is a performance-based service 
similar to a utility [Ref. 16].  It takes a different mindset to accept that everything, 
including ownership of the resources, has been turned over to the vendor and that the 
organization no longer owns, buys, or controls hardware, software, maintenance or other 
things as in the past.  This often leads to a fear of the loss of control by turning everything 
over to a contractor [Ref. 1].  Other stakeholder concerns are that seat management 
contracts can be limiting and lack flexibility [Ref. 47].  These concerns must be surfaced 
and addressed in order for the necessary culture change to take place. 
Another source of resistance to the change to seat management is the "sticker 
shock" when an organization realizes the true costs of PC ownership [Ref. 17].  For 
example, without proper education, it is hard for the leaders or comptroller of an 
organization to initially endorse a "seat price" of $3,500 - or more - per year to get (in 
their perception) a desktop computer that can be bought at the local office supply store 
for a one-time outlay of $2,000.   
As noted by one seat management contractor, "this is a very difficult concept to 
sell.  You have to prove the total cost of ownership." [Ref. 16]  Another contractor 
similarly stated that "many agencies don't have an accurate idea of the total cost of 
running and maintaining their PC networks…if government managers aren't ready to 
accept the true value of these costs, then they will have trouble adopting the PC 
outsourcing concept." [Ref. 16]   
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Stakeholders need to be educated regarding the nature of a seat management 
contract and regarding the cost aspects.  This relates to the TCO concept discussed in an 
earlier section of this thesis where TCO was defined as a "method used to define and 
measure the total cost of acquiring and maintaining a desktop computing environment."  
[Ref. 35]  A TCO computation includes the direct costs of hardware, software, support 
services, maintenance, etc., and indirect costs such as lost productivity due to downtime.  
However, determining the true total cost of ownership in a seat management environment 
is difficult because "everybody defines it differently." [Ref. 8]     
 Of course, TCO has been a difficult issue for the Government.  GAO's review of 
six agencies and their use of seat management contracts noted that all six did not 
sufficiently analyze their baseline and projected costs before implementing seat 
management. [Ref. 34]  Without accurate baseline data, it becomes even more 
challenging to deal with the resistance engendered by seat management "sticker shock."   
However, this issue must be addressed to affect the necessary culture change.  
Communication is the key to effective change management and overcoming the 
resistance that is surfaced, and this communication must come from the highest levels of 
the organization.  Senior leadership must define the changes taking place, articulate the 
new vision, and the reasons for the change to seat management.  Of course, the 
organization's top leaders themselves must be committed to the implementation of seat 
management.  In GAO's review of six agencies and their use of seat management 
contracts, they identified "obtaining agency commitment, especially by top management" 
as one of the primary lessons learned [Ref. 34].    
 In fact, GAO stated that their "wide-ranging work on federal management issues" 
has demonstrated that "perhaps the single most important element of successful 
management improvement initiatives is the demonstrated commitment of top leaders to 
change."  GAO's research also showed that "executive leadership is a critical success 
factor for outsourcing IT services in the commercial world."  [Ref. 34] 
 All stakeholders must come to fully understand the new vision and the benefits 
derived from the seat management contract.  Resistance to the change can be minimized 
and the necessary culture change promoted only if the message from the senior leadership 
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is consistent and strongly emphasizes the benefits derived from the seat management 
approach.  Stakeholders need to believe that the long-term benefits to the organization 
will be worth their short-term pain in making the transition. 
In their analysis of leading commercial best practices for outsourcing of IT 
services, GAO recommended that the leadership clearly communicate to all employees 
what is going to happen (and when), continue to communicate changes as they occur, 
handle resistance to change with meetings between senior managers and employees, shift 
corporate attention from non-core functions (such as IT support) to core business 
functions, and use change management strategies to help employees deal with the 
changes [Ref. 33].  Similarly, in their report issued as a result of their review of six 
agencies and their use of seat management contracts, GAO recommended that the 
necessary culture change can be assisted by such change management communication 
processes as keeping the entire organization informed throughout the initiative, 
conducting "regular peer to peer meetings" at each level in the organization, and securing 
key executive support [Ref. 34].  
 As part of the communication processes to promote the necessary culture change, 
contract specific education and training will also be needed.  It is important that all 
stakeholders (e.g., managers, end-users, vendor oversight personnel, etc.) be kept 
appraised of progress on the move to seat management as well as their roles and 
responsibilities in the transition as well as during contract performance.  Such education 
and training should cover such topics as the seat management services; performance 
measures; oversight organization, responsibilities, and communications; funding issues; 
incentives and penalties; invoicing and payment; etc.  Once all of the stakeholders are 
fully educated on the new approach, the details of how it will work, and their roles in 
carrying it out, resistance to the change emanating from such fears as a loss of control can 
be mitigated. 
Managing culture change is a difficult and complex task.  However, effective 
communications and basic change management strategies can go a long way towards 
diffusing resistance to the implementation of a seat management approach and promoting 
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shared values among the members of the organization that are rooted in the benefits to be 
derived from the new approach to acquiring desktop computing power.   
 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter provided a detailed examination of the significant challenges and 
concerns associated with the seat management method of contracting for desktop IT 
capabilities.  These challenges involve benchmarking technical performance 
requirements, establishing performance measures, creating effective incentives, preparing 
for the transition to seat management, and managing the required culture change.  By 
effectively addressing these challenges when structuring the requirements and the 
contract, commercial expertise and best practices can be leveraged to increase the 
likelihood of achieving such potential benefits of seat management as better response 
time, more reliable system availability, and reduced network downtime. 
 The next chapter, Chapter IV, provides a detailed analysis of the NMCI program's 
approach to addressing the challenges associated with seat management that were 
explored in Chapter III.  By evaluating how well the NMCI program is responding to 
these challenges, recommendations can be provided as to where improvements can be 
made in order to increase the likelihood that NMCI will achieve its expected benefits. 
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IV. NMCI PROGRAM'S APPROACH TO THE CHALLENGES 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes and analyzes the NMCI program's approach to addressing 
the challenges associated with the seat management method of IT contracting that were 
identified and explored in Chapter III.  Significant challenges that must be addressed 
involve: benchmarking technical requirements, establishing performance measures, 
creating effective incentives, preparing for the transition to seat management, and 
managing the required culture change. 
By effectively addressing these challenges when structuring the requirements and 
the contract, it is more likely that commercial expertise and best practices can be 
leveraged to result in the potential benefits associated with seat management (e.g., better 
response time, more reliable system availability, reduced downtime, etc.). 
This chapter examines how NMCI is dealing with the seat management 
challenges that were explored previously in this thesis.  By evaluating how well the 
NMCI program is responding to these challenges, recommendations can be provided as 
to where improvements can be made in order to increase the likelihood that NMCI will 
achieve its expected benefits. 
 
B. BENCHMARKING TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 
 As discussed in Chapter III, it is a daunting challenge to define the technical 
requirements of a seat management contract (or any IT contract) in an environment of 
rapid technological changes.  It is not practical to set forth absolute technical standards in 
a contract that will last many years.  The rapid technological advances in the marketplace 
make such standards quickly outdated.  As noted in Chapter III, benchmarking is a 
common alternative to specifying firm technical requirements. 
A benchmark is defined as a minimum industry-based standard that must be met 
and serves to take into account changes in technology.  Setting benchmarks for the 
technical requirements not only accommodates technology advances, but also allows for 
monitoring contractor compliance with requirements to keep up with those advances. 
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The NMCI contract, as noted in Chapter II, is a multi-year contract with a five-
year base period and a three-year option period (therefore, potentially lasting eight years 
if the option period is exercised).  In order to deal with the challenge of defining the 
technical requirements of the contract in an environment of continual change, the NMCI 
contract references the generic benchmark known as "state-of-the-shelf."   
As defined in Chapter III, this term refers to the best technology that is currently 
(and sufficiently) available in the marketplace.  Using a state-of-the-shelf benchmark 
recognizes a commercial best practice balancing of technology, usability, stability, and 
value. 
The NMCI contract specifies four different types of basic "fixed workstation 
seats" (i.e., networked desktop PCs) denoted as "red," "white," "blue," and "thin-client" 
seats [Ref. 6].  As noted in Chapter II, the NMCI program offers other "access devices," 
although the fixed workstations are the largest component of the program (and qualify 
NMCI as a seat management contract).  The technical requirements of the fixed 
workstation seats are defined in the contract based upon the "state-of-the-shelf" 
benchmark. 
The contractually specified technical requirement for a "red" seat (the highest 
priced basic workstation) demands "performance equal to or greater than 75 percent of 
the performance of the high-end commercially available state-of-the-shelf workstation at 
the time it is deployed and refreshed."  The requirements for "white" and "blue" seats are 
65 percent and 60 percent, respectively, of the same performance benchmark.  The 
requirement for "thin client" seats (used mainly as simple data input stations for shared 
server-based applications) calls for 50 percent of the same benchmark. [Ref. 6] 
NMCI offers a "high-end seat upgrade" package as an optional item on the "red" 
seats.  According to the contract, this upgrade "adds enhanced performance (i.e., high 
bandwidth and CPU-intensive processing) beyond the requirements of a base seat."  For a 
(rather substantial) price premium, the contractually specified technical requirement 
increases to "performance equal to greater than 90 percent of the performance of the 
high-end commercially available state-of-the-shelf workstation." [Ref. 6] 
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While "state-of-the-shelf" is a reasonably well defined and industry recognized 
benchmark (i.e., the best technology that is currently - and sufficiently - available in the 
commercial marketplace), the addition of the "high end" language appears somewhat 
redundant as "state-of-the-shelf" already refers to the "best technology" sufficiently 
available in the marketplace at the time of deployment (or periodic refreshment) which 
would logically imply a "high end" workstation. 
Nonetheless, by basing the technical requirements of the contract on such a 
benchmark, the technical standards for the various types of seats are not fixed in the 
contract, but rather are tied to what is available in the marketplace at the time a seat is 
installed or subject to technology refreshment.  Not only does the use of such benchmarks 
allow the contract requirements to keep up with technology changes and market realities, 
they also allow the contractor's performance to be measured against standards that do not 
become obsolete during the life of the contract. 
While the use of the "state-of-the-shelf" benchmark in the NMCI contract is 
reasonably simple and consistent, it is not necessarily well understood by all parties.  
Although the contractor, the Contracting Officer, and the Government program managers 
(presumably) understand what is required by the benchmark, the myriad of NMCI users 
within the Navy and Marine Corps may not have the same level of understanding.  When 
end-users are preparing NMCI order requests for their activities, it is vital that all 
potential users (i.e., customers of NMCI) have a clear understanding of what the various 
seats entail so that orders can be placed that adequately meet the end users' true 
requirements (while still representing the minimum Government needs). 
To deal with this situation, the NMCI contractor posts to its website a current 
description of the technical specifications for each type of seat.  These specifications are 
Government approved and represent - at any given time - the exact type of hardware that 
is provided for each type of seat available under the contract. 
For example, in January 2003, the hardware provided for a "red" seat consisted of 
a Pentium IV 2.4 Gigahertz processor with 533 Megahertz front side bus, 256 Megabyte 
random access memory, and a 40 Gigabyte disk drive.  A "white" seat was based on a 
Pentium IV 2.0 Gigahertz processor with 400 Megahertz front side bus, 128 Megabyte 
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random access memory, and a 20 Gigabyte disk drive.  A "blue" seat was based on the 
contractor furnishing a 1.8 Gigahertz Celeron processor with 400 Megahertz front side 
bus, 128 Megabyte random access memory, and a 20 Gigabyte disk drive.  There were 
similar exact specifications for "thin client" seats and for the "high-end upgrade 
package."  [Ref. 48] 
 By providing a method (via the contractor's website) that NMCI users can use to 
examine and consider the exact specifications for the hardware at any given time, the 
NMCI program ensures that the generic benchmarking of the technical requirements in 
the contract itself does not preclude any potentially interested parties from clearly 
understanding what would actually be provided to end users under the benchmarked 
requirements.  The exact seat specifications maintained on the contractor's website can be 
updated periodically as technology advances and the equipment provided evolves to keep 
up with the generic benchmark requirements in the contract. 
 As awarded, the NMCI contract does not address specifically how the 
Government evaluates or approves the contractor's proposed specifications for the 
hardware to be provided at any given time (i.e., in terms of whether or not the exact 
specifications would meet the generic benchmarks in the contract).  However, under the 
service level agreements (SLAs), the SLA for "technology refreshment" indicates that 
through "continuous monitoring," the relative performance of NMCI workstations is 
evaluated based upon "objective test results using test scenarios mutually agreed to by the 
Government and the contractor." [Ref. 6] 
 Modification P00051 to the contract updated the SLAs.  As a result, the SLA for 
technology refreshment now indicates that relative performance of NMCI workstations is 
evaluated based upon a "percentage of the high-end state-of-the-shelf workstation score 
as posted to the SYSmark results page" maintained by Business Applications 
Performance Corporation (BAPCo).  The new requirements indicate that the contractor 
submits to the Contracting Officer, on a quarterly basis, the "SYSmark test reports and 
their corresponding proposed NMCI seat configurations." [Ref. 49] 
 SYSmark is a "performance benchmark suite" developed by BAPCo as a "tool for 
evaluation of personal computer performance in business environments." The SYSmark 
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tool uses industry based usage characteristics to evaluate PC performance based on 
response time as the "fundamental unit of performance." [Ref. 50]   
 By using an independent, industry recognized evaluation tool, the Government 
ensures that the exact specifications set forth periodically by the vendor for the various 
types of NMCI seats meet or exceed the generic benchmark used in the contract to define 
the technical requirements. 
 As noted in this section, the NMCI program employs benchmarking to define the 
contract's technical requirements in an environment of continual change.  The approach 
(including quarterly updates of the exact product specifications to be delivered against the 
generic benchmark and public posting of those specifications) ensures that the simple and 
consistent benchmark is effectively understood by all interested parties.   
Unfortunately, however, the NMCI program does not have a plan to periodically 
revisit the benchmarks themselves to determine whether or not they should be updated to 
remain relevant to changing user needs [Ref. 51].  As user needs evolve over time (and in 
response to technological advancements in the marketplace), it is unclear if performance 
equal to 65% (for example) "of the performance of the high-end commercially available 
state-of-the-shelf workstation" will be as effective or appropriate in meeting end user 
needs as it was at the time the benchmark was established.   
 
C. EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 As outlined in Chapter III, "performance management" is a term used to 
encompass the tasks of defining the minimum acceptable performance standards for a 
contract and establishing a performance monitoring approach to determine whether or not 
the required performance standards are met.  At its most basic level, performance 
management is the process of monitoring vendor performance against the contractual 
requirements. 
As noted previously, many IT contracts (including seat management 
arrangements) include performance measures rooted in the tactical (vice strategic) 
performance management concept of service levels.  Such service level performance 
management is usually defined and managed through the use of "service level 
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agreements" or SLAs.  A SLA is a contractual commitment to meet specific service 
goals, along with the methods to monitor performance. 
The NMCI contract relies upon SLAs to establish the performance-based service 
goals that the contractor must meet when delivering services.  As awarded, the contract 
included forty-four separate SLAs [Ref. 6].  Modification P00051 to the contract updated 
and replaced the SLAs.  While there are still forty-four separate SLAs, they were revised 
to "clarify the SLA processes and levels of measurement." [Ref. 49] 
NMCI includes SLAs geared toward broad areas categorized as user upgrades, 
end-user services, maintenance and help desk services, communication services, system 
services, information assurance services, and "other" requirements.  Table 2 lists the 
various SLAs contained within the NMCI contract (as modified). 
Each SLA contains various "sub-measures," ranging in quantity from one to 
eleven per SLA (although most SLAs have four or more).  These sub-measures are 
essentially the "service level objectives," or specific areas within each SLA that are 
measured.  For example, the SLA for email services has five separate sub-measures 
covering availability of the service (with a standard of 99.5% to 99.7%), problem 
resolution (with a standard of 30 minutes to one hour), performance of email transfer 
(with a standard of <5 minutes), interoperability (with a standard requiring notification of 
failure within three hours), and customer satisfaction (with a standard of at least 85% 
satisfactory ratings).  
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NMCI Service Level Agreement Categories 
User Upgrades: Maintenance and Help Desk Services: 
Desktop H/W and Operating System Basic Help Desk Services 
End User Services: Communications Services: 
Standard Office Automation Software Wide Area Network Connectivity 
E-mail Services BAN/LAN Communications Services 
Directory Services Moveable Video Teleconferencing Seat 
File Shared Services Proxy and Caching Services 
Web Access Services External Networks 
Newsgroup Services Systems Services: 
Print Services Network Management System Services 
NMCI Intranet Performance Operational Support Services 
NIPRNET Access Capacity Planning 
Internet Access Domain Name Server 
Mainframe Access Application Server Connectivity 
Desktop Access to Government Apps Network Operations Display 
Moves, Adds, and Changes Information Assurance Services: 
Software Distribution and Upgrades Security Operational Services General 
User Training Security Operational Services PKI 
Unclassified Remote Access Security Operational Services SIPRNET 
Classified Remote Access Security Planning Services 
Portable Workstation Wireless Dial-in Other Requirements: 
Organizational Messaging Services Integrated Configuration Management 
Desktop VTC (hardware & software) Integration and Testing 
Voice Communications Technology Refreshment 
Voice Mail Technology Insertion 
 Sea-Shore Rotation Support Training 
 
Table 2.  NMCI SLA Categories. [Ref. 49]  
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As another example, the SLA for directory services has seven separate sub-
measures covering availability of the service (with a standard of 99.5% to 99.7%), 
network responsiveness (with a standard of <2 seconds to search the directory), dial-in 
responsiveness (with a standard of <20 seconds), timeliness of directory updates (with a 
standard of within four hours at least 99.9% of the time), accuracy of the directory (with a 
standard of 99.9%), interoperability (with a standard requiring notification of failure 
within three to six hours), and customer satisfaction (with a standard of at least 85% 
satisfactory ratings).   
Considering the forty-four separate SLAs and the numerous sub-measures, there 
are fully 201 individual performance aspects that are measured.  To further complicate 
matters, each of these 201 performance aspects has three separate standards depending 
upon required "levels of service," which are defined by the options that may have been 
ordered with a given seat.  Specifically, each performance aspect has one standard for a 
"basic" seat (i.e., without any ordered options), another standard for a "high-end" seat 
(i.e., ordered with the high-end upgrade package), and a third standard for a "mission 
critical" seat (i.e., ordered with the mission critical upgrade package).  In some cases, 
however, an individual performance aspect will have the same standard for each of the 
three levels of service. 
Considering the 201 individual performance aspects and the three different 
standards for each, there are over 600 specific performance metrics that are monitored 
and reported.  However, there are common sub-measures that appear frequently 
throughout the SLAs.  For instance, customer satisfaction is one of the sub-measures 
under the vast majority of the forty-four SLAs.  Other sub-measures that cross many of 
the SLAs (where appropriate) include availability, responsiveness, and interoperability.  
Of course, availability - for example - means different things depending upon which SLA 
it is applied to.  
The NMCI Execution Plan supplements the SLA information contained in the 
contract.  The Execution Plan indicates that SLA compliance is jointly monitored by the 
contractor and the Navy on a monthly basis.  The Execution Plan, as written, provides 
that the contractor and the Government work together to "establish measurement 
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methodology" for those SLAs where the contract (as awarded) was unclear [Ref. 52].  
This was accomplished when modification P00051 was issued (although the modification 
was not issued until more than two years after the contract was executed). 
As modified, the contract spells out the measurement method and reporting 
frequency for each of the 201 individual sub-measures of performance.  For example, the 
SLA for web access services provides that the performance aspect of availability is 
measured continuously at the web server as a percentage of time available, with daily 
summarization and monthly reporting (subject to Government or designated third party 
audit).  The performance aspect of web access performance is measured using automated 
network scripts placed on end-user workstations, with the script run three times daily for 
one hour each with measurements taken every five minutes and averaged during the hour 
(with monthly reporting). 
As established in the contract, the SLAs cover the common performance 
measurement areas (as discussed in Chapter III) of vendor responsiveness, system 
availability, and (at least indirectly) system downtime.  In addition to technical 
performance areas, the SLAs also address end-user satisfaction (which was a GAO 
recommendation).  By including sub-measures of customer satisfaction, the quantitative 
technical performance data can be supplemented with qualitative information. 
Upon review, the SLAs are defined in specific terms (to prevent ambiguities or 
multiple interpretations), appear to be sufficiently standard (to allow for potential 
comparisons to different vendors on other efforts), and reserve Government or third party 
audit rights where appropriate.  The SLAs also spell out the reporting requirements and 
responsibilities of the parties.  In addition, the SLAs appear to exhibit consistency in that 
common terms (such as customer satisfaction) are used consistently within - and across - 
the various SLAs. 
As modified, the SLAs certainly cover all desired areas of performance and 
exhibit a high level of "completeness" which was explained in Chapter III to encompass 
covering all functions that are monitored (the forty-four SLAs) and all specific aspects of 
each service level that are measured (the 201 individual performance aspects or service 
level objectives). 
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Of course, as noted previously in this thesis, a common mistake is specifying too 
many SLAs.  Just because the PWS requires a specific service, it does not necessarily 
mean that a SLA must be dedicated to it.  The objective of the contract should be to send 
the vendor a clear message about those requirements that are most important to the 
customer's success.  It is recommended that the SLAs (and sub-measures within them) be 
limited to only those that are truly critical.  It has been noted that as the SLAs become 
more comprehensive, the service costs (and customer costs to monitor performance) 
increase. 
It would appear that forty-four separate SLAs, containing 201 specific 
performance aspects (or sub-measures), with more than 600 individual performance 
metrics to be monitored and reported (considering the three levels of service), is extreme.  
While such an extensive, enterprise-wide program as NMCI should be expected to have 
numerous performance measures, a tradeoff is necessary.  Such an extensive number of 
performance measures require a great deal of resources (both from the contractor and 
from the Government) to monitor the contractor's compliance.  While it is important to 
use an adequate number of measures to monitor the important areas of performance, it is 
also important to restrict the number of measures to only those that are truly critical to the 
mission of the organization.  It appears that the extensive number of performance 
measures on the NMCI contract could be streamlined. 
The NMCI Execution Plan notes that there are two main "strategic performance 
goals" for the NMCI contract.  The primary goal is information superiority, which is 
defined as providing our forces with "the capability to collect, process, and disseminate 
an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to 
do the same."  The Plan explains that in order to promote information superiority, there 
"needs to be connectivity between all parts of the shore establishment, and with all 
deployed forces at sea and ashore." [Ref. 52] 
The second "high level goal" is to foster innovation.  The Plan explains that by 
providing interoperability and a "high level of common services" within the Navy, NMCI 
"create[s] an environment that supports innovative ways of integrating doctrine and 
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tactics," while "leading activities into new operational capabilities and more productive 
ways of using resources." [Ref. 52] 
The Plan indicates that in order to determine the Navy's progress toward these key 
strategic goals, performance measurements under the contract are focused on 
interoperability, information assurance, service efficiency, customer satisfaction, work 
force capabilities, process improvement, and operational performance. 
Upon review, a key opportunity for improvement in administration of the NMCI 
contract is to streamline the SLAs.  There should be an effort to reduce the forty-four 
SLAs to only those that are truly critical to the two strategic goals of information 
superiority (emphasizing connectivity) and fostering innovation (emphasizing 
interoperability).  In addition, an effort should be made to reduce the redundancy in the 
current number of sub-measures.  For example, customer satisfaction can be combined 
into one SLA vice the current format where customer satisfaction is a sub-measure 
appearing dozens of times across the various SLAs. 
By streamlining the SLAs so that they cover only those performance areas truly 
critical for the program's success, efficiencies may be gained and a clear message sent to 
the contractor as to the performance areas that are vital for the Navy's success. 
With regard to revising the SLAs, the Execution Plan provides a process whereby 
Customer Technical Representatives (CTRs) - who are Government employees that assist 
the Contracting Officer's Representatives (CORs) at the claimant level - can identify 
cases where the existing SLAs do not cover services that "enable their NMCI end users to 
be effective" and recommend changes to be accomplished by contract modification [Ref. 
52].  The Plan provides that the contractor and Government jointly assess the impact and 
cost of modifying the SLAs. 
Unfortunately, however, the NMCI program does not have a plan to periodically 
(and automatically) revisit the SLAs to determine whether they should be updated to 
remain relevant; nor does the performance measurement system provide for escalating 
performance standards at periodic intervals; and there is no plan in place at present to 
compare the contractor's performance over time (as measured by the SLAs) to other 
contractors' performance on similar seat management efforts [Ref. 51]. 
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Notwithstanding these opportunities for potential improvement, the Execution 
Plan does provide for trend analysis of the contractor's performance in meeting the SLAs.  
Further, the NMCI contract and the Execution Plan both indicate that the contractor will 
not be held responsible for missing the SLAs when actions of the Government or a third 
party are the cause, and the NMCI contract ties incentives and penalties to the 
contractor's performance as measured by the SLAs.  The incentive approach is discussed 
in the next section. 
 
D. INCENTIVES 
As described in Chapter III, a key challenge inherent in performance based 
service contracting (including seat management contracts) is identifying and establishing 
effective incentives.  Creating effective incentives is strongly related to the selected 
performance management strategies and the use of effective performance measures.  As 
noted previously, incentives can stand alone or can be combined with penalties for a 
"carrot and stick" approach to motivating contractor performance.  A common approach 
to incentives in seat management efforts is to relate the incentives (and often penalties, as 
well) to the performance measures defined in the SLAs. 
The NMCI contract contains several incentive provisions and also provides a 
penalty process.  There are five discreet financial incentives available to the contractor, of 
which one is explicitly contingent upon the contractor meeting the contract SLAs.  The 
penalty process is directly related to contractor performance as measured by the SLAs. 
While not specifically described as one of the five contract incentives, the NMCI 
contract does contain a unique payment provision that certainly acts as an incentive.  The 
contract provides that the contractor will only receive payments totaling 85% of the 
contractual seat prices during the transition period until such time as the contractual 
SLAs are met.  Once the contractor meets (or exceeds) the SLAs, they are then entitled to 
payments equal to 100% of the contractual seat prices. 
The first of the five explicit incentives in the NMCI contract is a one-time 
incentive payment of $10 million when the contractor successfully achieves full 
operational capability (FOC).  The definition of FOC is "steady state contract guaranteed 
51 
number of users having the ability to receive ordered services." [Ref. 6]  The ability to 
receive ordered services, of course, does not necessarily require full SLA compliance.  It 
is possible for users to successfully access NMCI services without the contractor meeting 
the availability or customer satisfaction measures within the SLAs. 
The second NMCI incentive is related to customer satisfaction.   Per the terms of 
the contract, the customer satisfaction incentive applies only if the contractor meets the 
SLAs.  This incentive is also related to the SLAs as most of the forty-four separate SLAs 
have a specific sub-measure related to customer satisfaction.  The stated purpose of the 
customer satisfaction incentive is to incentivize "service provider responsiveness to user 
needs." [Ref. 6] 
The contract provides that customer satisfaction is determined by quarterly 
surveys of users.  The Execution Plan provides that the Government and the contractor 
work together to develop a mutually agreeable customer satisfaction survey.  The 
Execution Plan indicates that the survey "will be considered a continually evolving 
document with established periods of refreshment." [Ref. 52]  This recognizes that, over 
time, user requirements and goals are likely to change as technology improves and 
missions evolve. 
Assuming that the SLAs are met, the customer satisfaction incentive is $25 per 
seat, per quarter, if more than 85% of users rate NMCI services as "above average" on the 
satisfaction survey.  The incentive is $50 per seat, per quarter, if more than 90% of users 
rate the services as "above average" on the survey, and $100 per seat, per quarter, if more 
than 95% of users rate the services as "above average." 
The third incentive in the NMCI contract is related to information assurance (IA).  
The stated purpose of the IA incentive is to "focus continued high level attention" on IA 
as the "actions necessary to assure security of information will change as new attack 
methods are developed or network weaknesses discovered."  The contract provides that 
the Government will perform "unannounced information warfare" on the contractor's 
network with the incentive to be determined based upon "performance against electronic 
survivability service levels." [Ref. 6] 
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This incentive is also tied to the SLAs as four of the forty-four separate SLAs are 
related to IA.  The IA SLAs include performance standards for several sub-measures that 
are based upon network intrusion testing.  The contract provides that the contractor may 
receive an incentive amount up to $10 million per year.  The specific amount of the IA 
incentive is determined by an incentive review board (IRB) at the end of each six-month 
evaluation period (with a maximum of $5 million available per period). 
The fourth NMCI incentive is related to small and small disadvantaged business 
subcontracting participation.  The stated purpose of this incentive is to "encourage 
continued small and small disadvantaged business participation at a level higher than the 
level of 40% over all and 10% subcontracted to the first tier."  The contract provides that 
the contractor may receive an incentive amount up to $1.25 million per year.  The 
specific amount of the small business incentive is determined by an incentive review 
board (IRB) at the end of each six-month evaluation period (with a maximum of 
$625,000 available per period). [Ref. 6] 
The fifth incentive in the NMCI contract is related to utilization of Indian 
organizations and Indian-owned economic enterprises.  The contract provides that the 
contractor is allowed payment of five percent of the dollar amount subcontracted to 
Indian organizations or enterprises at any sub-tier.  The stated purpose of the incentive is 
to support DoD's Indian Incentive Program (IIP). 
The NMCI contract incentives are coordinated with, and effectively tied to, the 
performance measures as expressed by the contract SLAs (which was a key 
recommendation described in Chapter III).  The customer satisfaction incentive 
reinforces the fact that customer satisfaction is a sub-measure on most of the SLAs.  
Further, the customer satisfaction incentive is potentially far larger than all of the other 
incentives combined.  If the contractor achieves the maximum available of $100 per seat, 
per quarter, they could earn more than $120 million per year once the contract is fully 
implemented (with over 300,000 users).  This clearly emphasizes to the vendor that 
customer satisfaction is key to the program's success.  The IA incentive is also tied to the 
SLAs as four of them directly relate to IA. 
53 
As previously discussed in Chapter III, the customer satisfaction surveys will be 
most effective if they solicit qualitative information to support the quantitative survey 
responses.  The customer satisfaction surveys for NMCI are expected to be designed to 
solicit both objective and subjective information [Ref. 51]. 
The NMCI contract incentives relate directly to the program's strategic 
performance goals of supporting information superiority (in part through connectivity) 
and fostering innovation (in part through interoperability).  Information assurance and 
customer satisfaction are specifically included in the seven "strategic performance 
measurement categories" included in the NMCI Execution Plan (as noted in the previous 
section).  As discussed in Chapter III, it is vital that a contract's incentives be designed to 
incentivize the contractor to contribute to an organization's mission and goals.    
The FOC incentive and the unique payment provision (i.e., 100% payment upon 
full SLA compliance) also emphasize to the contractor the importance of their technical 
performance.  In addition, these incentives are related to the transition period in that they 
incentivize the contractor to complete the transition processes quickly to become eligible 
for additional payments.  The small business and Indian organization incentives, 
conversely, serve to promote some of the Government's broader socio-economic goals.   
As noted previously, the NMCI contract also contains penalty provisions.  Under 
the heading of "credit for service downtime," the contract contains a service level 
incentive and penalty, or "SLIP," process whereby the contractor earns debits and credits 
of points in an account (known as a SLIP account) depending upon whether performance 
exceeds - or falls below - the standard for each performance measure within the SLAs.   
Specifically, when the contractor meets or exceeds the SLA metrics, points are deposited.  
If the contractor does not meet the SLA metrics, points are withdrawn. [Ref. 6]   
At any point in time, the balance of points in the SLIP account (either positive or 
negative) provides a snapshot of service performance.  At the end of the year, a positive 
balance of points does not result in additional incentive payments (as the contractor is 
rewarded for good performance primarily through the customer satisfaction incentive).  
However, a negative balance at year end will result in the contractor refunding a dollar 
amount (hence the penalty) up to 20% of the total seat price.  The actual amount of the 
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refund would be based upon the number of negative points in the account at the end of 
the year multiplied by a predetermined dollar value for each point. 
The NMCI approach to penalties complies with some of the commercial best 
practices discussed in Chapter III such as considering failure to meet individual SLAs (as 
well as aggregate performance requirements for which the penalty is the 85% payment 
provision).  However, the NMCI contract penalty approach does not consider the other 
best practices such as having increasing penalties for continued poor performance or 
allowing some refund of penalties if required performance levels are restored quickly 
[Ref. 51]. 
 
E. PREPARING FOR THE TRANSITION TO NMCI 
As discussed in Chapter III, a key challenge inherent in seat management 
contracting is preparing for, and facilitating, the actual transition to this new way of 
acquiring the services.  As noted, there are two basic areas that must be addressed in 
transition planning.  The first is the transition of the actual IT assets and services 
themselves (i.e., the "IT environment"), and the second is the transition of any displaced 
human capital as a result of outsourcing functions associated with supporting the desktop 
computing capability.  Effective communication is vital to both of these transition areas. 
It is important that all key stakeholders (e.g., managers, oversight personnel, 
vendor personnel, etc.) be kept appraised of progress on the transition as well as their 
roles and responsibilities in the transition (as well as during performance).  As noted in 
Chapter III, GAO identified such communication as a commercial best practice for the 
outsourcing of large IT efforts. 
As noted in Chapter II, the NMCI contract was awarded in October 2000.  During 
the early transition period, frequent training sessions were held.  These "execution 
training" sessions covered such topics as an overview of NMCI services; organization, 
responsibilities, and communications; contract overview; funding issues; incentives and 
penalties; invoicing and payment; various transition-specific issues; and risk management 
efforts [Ref. 53].  One such session (attended by the author) was held on December 5, 
2000.  Attendees at this early execution training included senior representatives of Navy 
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claimant commands (i.e., high level customer representatives), CORs, end-user 
representatives, and various contracting officials. 
In addition to the early, high-level transition communication with key 
stakeholders, a well-developed process has been developed for site-specific transition 
efforts.  This site-specific transition process (and related procedures) will apply for each 
individual Navy - or Marine Corps - activity transitioning to NMCI.  The site-specific 
transition process focuses both on effective communication and on the technical 
procedures to transition the IT assets and services. 
  The site-specific transition process is outlined on the NMCI contractor's website 
for all interested parties to access.  Figure 3 provides a summary diagram of the transition 
process in effect during early Fiscal Year 2003.  
The first phase of the process is dubbed "planning change."  Beginning when the 
contractor receives a site-specific task order to provide NMCI services, this phase can last 
up to ninety days.  During this phase, the contractor is gathering information and making 
plans for "assumption of responsibility" (AOR) which is the point in time when the 
contractor takes over operational and financial responsibility for operating and 
maintaining the site's current legacy network (i.e., the existing, previously Government-




Figure 3.  Site-specific Transition Process.  [From: Ref. 53] 
 
During this planning phase, each site will complete a "preliminary site 
questionnaire" (PSQ) to identify and document physical site information, currently 
existing infrastructure (including networks), and equipment (including network devices, 
servers, etc.).  In addition, a "site concurrence memorandum" (SCM) is drafted, reviewed, 
approved, and executed by the Government site's leadership and the contractor.  Similar 
to the "entity relationship agreement" (ERA) described in Chapter III, the SCM outlines 
such things as the specific roles and responsibilities of the parties, further documents 
facility and access information, establishes a desktop implementation schedule, 
documents any shared resources, and discusses various program support and coordination 
issues. [Ref. 54] 
The other activities during this planning phase include identifying and 
documenting existing software licenses, planning for the termination of existing support 
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contracts, and identifying legacy (i.e., previously existing) site-specific IT applications 
that will need to be transitioned to the new NMCI environment. 
In the area of legacy applications, a specific guide has been developed by the 
Government.  Entitled the "Legacy Applications Transition Guide," this manual provides 
extensive information on such issues as "rapid certification" of the legacy application (to 
ensure it meets compatibility and information assurance requirements) as well as risk 
mitigation.  In fact, there is a separately defined "legacy application transition process." 
[Ref. 55] 
The planning phase - through such items as the PSQ and SCM - serves to 
document and communicate key information to the customer and contractor 
representatives who will execute the transition.  This complies with the GAO guidance 
(discussed in Chapter III) calling for communication of clear transition processes to all 
key players and documenting key information.  
The second phase of the site-specific transition process is called "site 
preparation."  Beginning with the AOR date, this phase can last from 30 to 60 days and 
involves the contractor assuming responsibility for the legacy network while performing 
the infrastructure "build-out" to support the NMCI services.  This entails installing and 
testing of new servers and networks, while planning for migration of desktop 
workstations and data files. [Ref. 54] 
The third phase of the transition process is called the "site transformation" phase.  
This phase begins with "cutover," which is when the old desktop workstations are 
replaced with new NMCI workstations and end-users begin to access the NMCI network 
to perform their duties.  Lasting another 30-60 days, this phase ends when the desktop 
rollout and data migration are complete, and SLA compliance is eventually achieved.  
During this final phase of the site-specific transition process, the contractor provides 
training to the end-users on such issues as data migration and usage of the new NMCI 
network environment. [Ref. 54] 
As part of the end-user training during the final transition phase, the contactor has 
developed a "workstation migration" guide with specific information on how user files 
are migrated from the legacy network and workstation to the new NMCI environment.  
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The guide also provides instructions on how to access the NMCI portal home page, "post-
migration" instructions for accessing applications and locating files, and instructions for 
backing up files and accessing transferred mail files [Ref. 56].  The end-user training 
during this phase also includes an Operational Readiness Overview presentation by 
contractor personnel where end-user questions and concerns may be addressed. 
The strong communication with Government employees who are users of the new 
NMCI environment satisfies the GAO recommendations (noted in Chapter III) for 
communication of clear transition processes to all employees and employing basic 
change management strategies. 
Interestingly, the site-specific transition process discussed above is also outlined 
on a Government website (maintained by the NMCI Director's office) for all interested 
parties to access.  While the process outlined on the Government site also contains three 
phases, some confusion may arise as the Government has chosen to give the phases 
different names.  As noted previously in this section, the three phases as outlined on the 
contractor's website (under a link titled "making the transition") are called "planning 
change," "site preparation," and "site transformation."  However, on the Government 
website (under a link dubbed "transition to NMCI") the same phases are called "pre-
AOR," "AOR to cutover," and "cutover." [Ref. 57] 
Notwithstanding the different titles for the transition phases, the three phases 
appear to contain the same steps.  In fact, several of the links on the Government website 
(e.g., the link for a sample SCM document) simply forward the web browser to the 
relevant items on the contractor's website.  Potential confusion could be eliminated by 
hosting the transition process on a single website (hosted by either the Government or the 
contractor), or at a minimum, using consistent terminology. 
As noted at the beginning of this section (and as discussed in Chapter III), 
planning for the transition of the IT environment is only one aspect of an effective 
transition to a seat management solution.  The second critical aspect is to plan for the 
transition of any displaced human capital as a result of outsourcing the functions 
associated with supporting the desktop computing capability. 
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The NMCI contract contains a clause entitled "expertise transition requirement" 
that states, "to the extent that any civilian Government employees are or will be 
incidentally displaced due to the NMCI initiative, the Contractor shall offer one or more 
positions to each such employee for employment openings under the contract."  The 
clause explains that the requirement applies to comparable positions for which the 
displaced employees are qualified, and that offers must comply with post-Government 
employment restrictions and conflict of interest standards.  The clause also requires that 
any retraining of displaced Government employees that is necessary will be the 
responsibility of the contractor. [Ref. 6]   
The transition information on the contractor's website explains the process for 
transition of displaced Government personnel to the NMCI contractor.  The process 
provides that Government IT personnel (who are not otherwise reassigned or placed by 
the Government) will be formally identified by the Government to the contractor.  The 
contractor will then host a "group meeting" with the impacted employees to provide 
information about employment with the contractor.  Displaced employees wishing to 
work for the contractor will be able to sign up for a one-on-one meeting with a contractor 
personnel manager where a job offer will be made. [Ref. 54]  
The NMCI contractor has committed to offering displaced employees 
employment "at or near" their current work location with a salary that is 15 percent 
higher than the employees' current salary, along with a three percent signing bonus.  In 
addition, the contractor guarantees three years of employment (although employees may 
be terminated "for cause").  The contractor further provides that the employees' "prior 
service date" with the Government will be recognized for benefits eligibility, vesting and 
early retirement eligibility for the contractor's retirement plan, and calculation of the 
annual retirement benefit.  In addition, the contractor has committed to recognizing the 
employees' "attained vacation level" if higher than otherwise allowed under the 
contractor's vacation program. [Ref. 54] 
The provisions of the NMCI program to deal with displaced human capital far 
exceed the traditional "right of first refusal" clause requirements.  Further, the NMCI 
provisions comply with the recommendations noted in Chapter III that the plan for 
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transition of displaced personnel utilize bonuses and incentives to encourage transition to 
the contractor.  Also, the presence of detailed information on the contractor's website and 
the "group meeting" provision focus on communication with impacted employees and the 
employment of basic change management strategies.  
 
F. MANAGING CULTURE CHANGE 
As described in Chapter III, one of the most difficult challenges associated with 
seat management contracting is managing the organizational culture change needed to 
successfully implement the new method of contracting for desktop computing power.  As 
noted, culture refers to "norms of behavior and shared values" among the members of an 
organization, and shared values are those "important concerns and goals held by most 
people in the group" that, in turn, shape the norms of behavior.   
Because seat management contracting represents a significant change to the way 
desktop computing capability is acquired and managed, change management strategies 
are important to building understanding and commitment to the new approach.  As 
discussed in Chapter III, the short-term goal of managing the necessary culture change is 
to build ownership of - and dedication to - the seat management approach, while the long-
term goal is to successfully implement the new concept.  Chapter III identified effective 
communication as the single most important tool in managing the required culture change 
as noted by GAO. 
Since the award of the NMCI contract in October 2000, communication has taken 
many forms.  As discussed in the previous section, early "execution training" sessions 
were provided to key stakeholders including senior representatives of Navy claimant 
commands (i.e., high level customer representatives), CORs, end-user representatives, 
and various contracting officials.  These sessions covered such topics as an overview of 
NMCI services; organization, responsibilities, and communications; contract overview; 
funding issues; incentives and penalties; invoicing and payment; various transition-
specific issues; and risk management efforts.  A key purpose of this training was to 
educate stakeholders that seat management is a performance-based service in order to 
counter fears related to loss of control by turning over IT assets to the contractor. 
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As noted in Chapter III, there are other concerns that also must be addressed in 
order to diffuse resistance to seat management and foster the necessary culture change 
throughout the organization.  These other concerns include the fear that seat management 
contracts lack flexibility and the “sticker shock” when an organization realizes the true 
cost of its desktop computing capability. 
With regard to the fear of a lack of flexibility, there have been some NMCI 
success stories that have been communicated.  A dramatic success story – and example of 
seat management flexibility – was reported in Chips Magazine, the Navy’s IT 
publication.  As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, much of the 
Navy’s Pentagon communication capabilities were lost.  The Navy was faced with a vast 
challenge – the “immediate restoration and reconstruction of its leadership’s IT 
platforms.”  The most significant problem was the need to reconstruct the Navy 
Communication Center and the Navy Budget Office, both of which were completely 
destroyed in the attack. [Ref. 58] 
The Navy's leadership realized that by utilizing the NMCI contract to reconstitute 
their IT capabilities, recovery time would be reduced by "more than half."  On September 
14th, workstations and fiber optic cabling were deployed from the NMCI contractor's 
staging facility and routers and switches were deployed from a subcontractor's facility.  
By the morning of September 15th, initial operational capability was established in 
temporary facilities for the Navy Communication Center.  By September 17th, initial 
operational capability was established for the Navy Budget Office.  By September 19th, 
merely eight days after the attack, the "crisis relocation" efforts were completed and the 
NMCI program allowed the Navy to recreate all of the computing capabilities lost in the 
attack with 700 employees back online conducting Navy business. [Ref. 58] 
By communicating such dramatic success stories, fears regarding any lack of 
flexibility associated with seat management (and the resistance to change that such fears 
engender) can be quickly put to rest.  With regard to the "sticker shock" issue, effective 
communication has also worked to overcome the problem (noted in Chapter III) where 
the leaders or comptroller of an organization are reluctant to initially endorse a "seat 
62 
price" of $3,500 - or more - per year to get (in their perception) a desktop computer that 
can be bought at the local office supply store for a one-time outlay of $2,000. 
  Figures from the Navy's business case analysis (BCA) were published in Chips 
Magazine to document that the Navy had computed a figure in excess of $3,800 per year 
per person as the "before NMCI" cost to obtain the services that would be provided more 
effectively (and less expensively) under the NMCI contract. At the time the article 
appeared, an average figure of $3,412 was used to demonstrate savings as a result of 
NMCI implementation. [Ref. 59] 
  Of interest, the Navy almost did not have the BCA figures available to counter 
the "sticker shock" issue.  In early 2000, before contract award, the program was 
criticized by (GAO) for proceeding prior to developing a formal analysis of alternative 
program options and completing a business case analysis. GAO was critical that the Navy 
had proceeded to issue a solicitation for the NMCI program under the impression that it 
was not required to comply with Department of Defense (DoD) Regulation 5000.2-R 
regarding major automated information systems (MAIS) programs.  As a result of the 
GAO inquiry, the Navy proceeded to develop a business case analysis to demonstrate the 
viability of its chosen approach by comparing the current state of IT within the 
Department to the "to be" state envisioned by NMCI.  By doing so, the Navy was able to 
demonstrate the viability of its seat management approach and the superiority of that 
solution over other potential alternatives.  In addition to satisfying GAO (and Congress), 
performing the BCA also provided ammunition to battle the "sticker shock" that could 
lead to resistance to the change. [Ref. 60] 
As noted in Chapter III, communication is the key to effective change 
management and overcoming the resistance that is surfaced.  However, in order build true 
commitment to the change, communication must come (at least partially) from the most 
senior levels of the organization.  Such communication must define the changes taking 
place, articulate the new vision, and provide the reasons for the change to seat 
management.  This high level communication must demonstrate that the top leaders are 
truly committed to the change. 
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With regard to the NMCI program, the Navy's Chips Magazine has been a key 
tool to repeatedly stress the senior leadership's support for NMCI.  The Secretary of the 
Navy (SECNAV) himself wrote that "we must, and we will, defeat the threat of global 
terrorism" with unmatched combat capability.  Key components of the Navy's combat 
capability arise from the use of new technologies and better business practices.  
According to SECNAV, information technology will "serve the warfighter by improving 
the processes of our supporting infrastructure and freeing up funds and billets for combat 
purposes."  It was also noted that by using IT, "we can leverage better business practices 
to achieve savings and improve the overall organization."  NMCI is a key component of 
using IT to support the warfighter. [Ref. 61] 
Another example of senior leadership's support and commitment was provided 
when the Program Executive Officer for IT (PEO-IT) wrote that the new vision of being 
able to "make decisions faster and solve problems faster" is enabled by NMCI through 
improved knowledge sharing.  As articulated by PEO-IT, the goals of NMCI are to 
"improve information security, to improve interoperability, to enable information 
superiority and optimize the cost per unit of service across the Enterprise." [Ref. 59] 
Effective communication - including demonstrated commitment of the 
organization's top leaders - appears to have been fairly effective at countering resistance 
to change and promoting the culture change necessary for the successful implementation 
of NMCI.  Articulation of the new vision, and the reasons behind the changes taking 
place, has been communicated to stakeholders and employees through a variety of 
forums, including Chips Magazine.  Frequent reinforcement of the anticipated benefits of 
NMCI has helped to address resistance to the change while building understanding of - 
and commitment to - NMCI. 
While the leadership's commitment to NMCI and the benefits to be derived from 
it have been effectively communicated, there is an opportunity for improvement in 
communicating the expected cost savings as a result of the BCA.  With the exception of 
the one Chips Magazine article noted, the author found no evidence that the BCA figures 
have been otherwise promulgated to employees or activity comptrollers (who will be 
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funding their local NMCI services).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is still a 
"sticker shock" problem within the enterprise. 
An opportunity for improvement also exists with regard to more effectively 
communicating the flexibility of the program.  While most of the stakeholders and many 
employees are aware of the dramatic success story related to the Pentagon, there are 
smaller success stories that can be communicated to further address any perceptions of a 
lack of flexibility in seat management contracting.  For example, the activity where the 
author works was flooded in February 2003, due to a steam heat malfunction.  The legacy 
desktop computer workstations were damaged and rendered unusable (along with much 
of the facility).  By exploiting the NMCI program, temporary workspaces for scores of 
employees were set up in training rooms and conference rooms in nearby buildings.  The 
NMCI contractor accelerated the activity's cutover to NMCI and successfully deployed 
nearly 100 workstations in only a few days.   
Such smaller success stories may be more relevant to most users and should be 
promulgated.  There may be a willingness on the part of program officials to use the 
NMCI Director's website (which is relatively new) to promulgate such "stories and 
lessons learned." [Ref. 51]  
  Considering the difficult and complex task of managing culture change, the 
NMCI program has come a long way in its first two years by surfacing and addressing 
sources of resistance and working to build acceptance of, and dedication to, the 
implementation of a large and complex seat management effort. 
 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a detailed examination of the NMCI program's approach to 
addressing the challenges associated with seat management that were explored in Chapter 
III.   The most significant challenges inherent in this method of IT contracting involve 
benchmarking technical performance requirements, establishing performance measures, 
creating effective incentives, preparing for the transition to seat management, and 
managing the required culture change.  In each of these key areas, the NMCI program has 
implemented many of the recommendations discussed in Chapter III, including both 
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those that originated from GAO recommendations and those that are commercial best 
practices.   
However, there are still some opportunities for improvement in addressing the 
challenges associated with seat management contracting.  A few adjustments to the 
program's approach can help increase the likelihood that NMCI will achieve its expected 
benefits.  The next chapter, Chapter V, provides the thesis conclusions, answers to the 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a summary of the preceding chapters by furnishing answers 
to the primary and secondary research questions that were posed in Chapter I.  This 
chapter also provides conclusions resulting from the preceding analysis of the NMCI 
program's approach to addressing the challenges associated with the seat management 
method of information technology contracting.  As a result of the research and analysis 
performed by the author, recommendations are provided as to where improvements can 
be made in order to increase the likelihood that NMCI will achieve its expected benefits.  
This chapter concludes with recommendations for further research or examination. 
 
B. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 As outlined in Chapter I, and explored in subsequent chapters, the author set forth 
to answer specific research questions regarding the seat management method of 
contracting for IT capability, the challenges associated with seat management, and the 
NMCI program's response to those challenges.  The answers to the research questions are 
presented below.  
1. Primary Research Question 
How well is the NMCI program responding to the challenges associated with seat 
management contracting and where can improvements be made? 
Overall, the NMCI program has a well-developed and logical approach to dealing 
with the challenges inherent in the seat management method of contracting for desktop IT 
capability.  With respect to each of the key challenges identified and explored in this 
thesis, the program is implementing many of the recommendations explored in Chapter 
III, including both those that originated from GAO recommendations and those that are 
commercial best practices. 
There are, however, opportunities for improvement where a few adjustments to 
the program's approach may help increase the likelihood that NMCI will achieve its 
expected benefits.  More details regarding the challenges and the opportunities for 
68 
improvement are provided in the answers to the secondary research questions, in the 
thesis conclusions, and in the recommendations provided in this Chapter.   
2. Secondary Research Questions  
a.  What is the seat management approach to contracting for IT resources? 
Sometimes referred to as "desktop outsourcing," seat management is the process 
wherein organizations outsource the ownership and maintenance of their networked 
desktop personal computers, including all required components and support.  The 
contractor becomes responsible for buying and maintaining the technology, providing 
support services (such as help desk support), and lifecycle management.   
In its simplest terms, seat management is where an organization buys its desktop 
computing power as a unified service with pricing computed on a per user (or per "seat") 
basis whereby the contractor is responsible to deliver all hardware, software, network 
support, planning/design, maintenance/installation, and periodic technology refreshment.  
In a seat management environment, the contractor maintains ownership of all the 
resources (e.g., network hardware, desktop hardware, software, etc.) and delivers the 
resultant computing capability - and all related support - as a performance based service, 
sometimes likened to a utility. 
Similar to most outsourcing initiatives, the theory is that by transferring 
ownership of (and responsibility for) its IT resources, an organization can focus on its 
core missions while leaving the provision and maintenance of IT capabilities to firms that 
specialize in it. 
The NMCI contract was awarded in October 2000 and will eventually provide 
seat management services to roughly 360,000 Navy and Marine Corps users.  The 
performance-based, IDIQ contract with Electronic Data Systems Corporation has a 
maximum value (including the option period) of $6.9 billion.  While the NMCI contract 
includes other "access devices" (such as laptops, portable and embarkable workstations), 
the fixed, desktop workstations (i.e., networked PCs) are the largest component of NMCI. 
b.  What are the expected benefits of a seat management approach? 
As discussed in Chapter II, lower costs (as are often associated with outsourcing 
efforts) are not necessarily an expected outcome when seat management is implemented.  
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Nevertheless, there are some distinct and tangible benefits associated with seat 
management.  Most of these benefits are technical in nature.   For example, with proper 
structuring of the requirements and the contract, commercial expertise and best practices 
can be leveraged to result in better network response time, more reliable system 
availability, and reduced downtime.   
Another way of looking at the potential benefits of seat management is from the 
perspective of enterprise management.  In large and complex organizations, replacing 
multiple smaller networks with a single, enterprise-wide managed service, can result in 
improved interoperability and access, more visibility of IT costs, and collateral savings.  
Collateral savings can be found by transitioning to a common operating environment 
which can lead to real savings in logistics and software support, while increasing the 
ability of those within the enterprise to collaborate using common sets of software.   
An important benefit of a seat management contract (especially when combined 
with an enterprise management perspective) is improved security.  When consolidating 
networks, multiple access points are eliminated reducing points of vulnerability in the 
system.   
Technology refreshment is another advantage of seat management contracting and 
consists of the periodic replacement of commercial off-the-shelf components such as 
processors, displays, operating systems, software, etc., to support the continued operation 
of the system through an indefinite service life.  Technology refreshment is a way to 
extend the useful life of the IT resources while keeping up with technological advances in 
the marketplace. 
As an additional benefit, seat management offers the ability to free up personnel 
resources that had previously been performing routine tasks associated with the desktop 
IT resources (e.g., helpdesk personnel).  By transferring the ownership and responsibility 
for the resources to commercial vendors who specialize in IT support, employees can 
focus on an organization's core mission rather than buying and maintaining desktop 
computer workstations. 
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c.  What are the expected benefits of NMCI? 
The NMCI program hopes to achieve many of the same benefits as may be found 
in other seat management efforts.  For example, the Navy hopes to achieve several 
important benefits from the perspective of enterprise management.  Once fully 
implemented, the NMCI contract will consolidate individual networks at over 300 
military bases into a single, enterprise-wide managed service.   
In addition to the generic benefits to be derived from an enterprise-wide approach 
(such as improved interoperability and more visibility of IT costs), transitioning to a 
common operating environment is expected to lead to real savings in logistics and 
software support, while increasing the ability of those within the Navy to collaborate 
using common software applications.  With regard to savings in logistics and software 
support, 3955 separate applications were identified across the Navy and Marine Corps 
and, of those, 1915 were eliminated leading to notable savings. 
The ability to collaborate using an enterprise-wide network and common software 
products offers tremendous benefits beyond savings in logistics and support.  In the case 
of the NMCI contract, NMCI will allow faster exchange of information between the 
warfighters in the field and the shore-based support organizations, enhancing lines of 
communication and reach-back capability. 
With regard to the expected benefit of improved security, the NMCI contract was 
particularly designed to include stringent information assurance requirements and to 
implement a higher level of security management than the Navy and Marine Corps had 
previously experienced.   
Technology refreshment offers yet another significant benefit to the Navy.  Under 
the NMCI contract, software is updated annually or to maintain one revision from the 
current state, while hardware is updated every three years.  By turning the technology 
refreshment over to the contractor, the Navy will avoid the burden of planning and 
budgeting in the traditional fashion for upgrades to multiple, disparate networks.  During 
the life of the NMCI contract, the Navy will not incur technology refreshment costs 
beyond the known seat pricing.   
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NMCI also hopes to achieve a benefit from seat management's ability to free up 
personnel resources that had previously been performing routine tasks associated with the 
desktop IT resources.  This is particularly important in the military realm where one of 
the stated purposes of the NMCI contract is to allow service members and Federal 
employees to be refocused on core Navy missions.  This benefit of seat management 
contracting is even more important in today's climate where the Government is finding it 
more difficult to compete with the private sector for IT personnel.   
Of course, NMCI also hopes to achieve the technical benefits of seat management 
such as better network response time, more reliable system availability, and reduced 
downtime. 
d.  What are the challenges and concerns associated with seat management 
contracting? 
There are several key challenges associated with the seat management method of 
contracting for desktop IT capability.  The most significant challenges, which were 
explored in detail in Chapter III, involve benchmarking technical performance 
requirements, establishing performance measures, creating effective incentives, preparing 
for the transition to seat management, and managing the required culture change.  By 
structuring the requirements and the contract to effectively address these challenges, there 
is an increased likelihood that the expected benefits of the seat management effort may be 
obtained. 
Benchmarking technical performance requirements is a way to define the 
technical requirements of a seat management contract (or any IT contract) in an 
environment of rapid technological changes.  It is not practical to set forth absolute 
technical standards in a contract that will last many years, as rapid advances in the 
marketplace would make such standards quickly outdated.  A benchmark is a minimum 
industry-based standard that must be met and serves to take into account changes in 
technology.  Setting benchmarks for the technical requirements not only accommodates 
technology advances, but also allows for monitoring contractor compliance with 
requirements to keep up with those advances. 
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Of course, to be effective, the benchmarks used must be simple, consistent, 
relevant to end-user needs, and clearly understood by all parties.  Further, decisions must 
be made as to how often the benchmarks will be revisited (to ensure that they remain 
relevant) and how it will be determined whether the solutions provided by the contractor 
satisfy the benchmarks. 
Establishing effective performance measures is a performance management issue 
that aims to:  (a) define the minimum acceptable performance standards to be met by the 
contractor; and (b) set forth a performance monitoring approach to determine whether or 
not the performance standards are met.  In its simplest terms, this is the process of 
monitoring vendor performance against the contractual requirements. 
Seat management arrangements (and other IT contracts) include performance 
measures rooted in the tactical performance management concept of service levels.  Such 
service level performance management is usually defined and managed through the use 
of "service level agreements" or SLAs.  A SLA is a contracting tool whereby customers 
and vendors agree up front which services and performance levels will be provided and 
how success or failure will be measured.   Essentially, a SLA is a contractual 
commitment to meet specific service goals, along with the methods to monitor 
performance.  It is vital that SLAs are adequately defined, thorough, and consistent, while 
only measuring performance that is under the control of the contractor.  Further, 
performance reporting requirements and change management need to be considered.  
Creating effective incentives is a key challenge inherent in all performance based 
service contracting (including seat management efforts) and is related to the selected 
performance management strategies and the use of effective performance measures.  
Incentives can stand alone or can be combined with penalties for a "carrot and stick" 
approach to motivating contractor performance.  A common approach to incentives in 
seat management efforts is to relate the incentives (and often penalties, as well) to the 
performance measures defined by the SLAs. 
In addition to coordinating the incentives with the performance measures, the 
incentive strategy should focus on customer satisfaction, consider the transition period, 
and support the strategic goals of the organization.  In the Government contracting arena, 
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incentives often relate to socio-economic goals.  When penalties are included in the 
incentive strategy, there are recognized best practices for their application. 
The transition to seat management is a two-fold challenge.  The first area 
addressed is the transition of the actual IT assets and services themselves (i.e., the "IT 
environment"), and the second is the transition of any displaced human capital as a result 
of outsourcing functions associated with supporting the desktop computing capability.  
Effective communication and change management strategies are vital to both of these 
transition areas. 
With regard to the first area, a clear transition process must be communicated to 
both key stakeholders and all affected parties.  "Entity Relationship Agreements" are a 
common commercial practice to document such items as roles and responsibilities during 
the transition, pre- and post-transition activities, shared resources, security, and legacy 
system connectivity.  With regard to the transition of human capital, communication with 
affected employees is critical.  Special contract provisions, and bonuses or incentives, can 
be used to encourage transfer of excess staff to the service provider. 
Another significant challenge is managing the required organizational culture 
change when implementing a seat management contract.  As seat management represents 
a significant change to the way desktop computing capability is acquired and managed, 
change management strategies are important to build understanding and commitment to 
the new approach.  The short-term goal of managing the necessary culture change is to 
build ownership of - and dedication to - the seat management approach, while the long-
term goal is to successfully implement the new concept.   
Effective management of the required culture change requires the education of 
stakeholders, dealing with fears regarding a loss of control (as ownership and 
management of the IT environment is being turned over to a contractor), and addressing 
the potential "sticker shock" if members of the organization do not know the true cost of 
networked PC ownership.  Commitment of the organization's leadership and effective 
communication are vital to managing the necessary culture change. 
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e.  How well is the NMCI program responding to those challenges? 
The NMCI program has a well-developed and logical approach to dealing with 
the challenges inherent in the seat management method of contracting for desktop IT 
capability.  With respect to each of the key challenges identified and explored in this 
thesis, the program is implementing many of the recommendations explored in Chapter 
III, including both those that originated from GAO recommendations and those that are 
commercial best practices. 
With regard to benchmarking technical requirements, the NMCI contract 
references the generic benchmark known as "state-of-the-shelf" in order to deal with the 
challenge of defining the technical requirements of the contract in an environment of 
continual change.  This term refers to the best technology that is currently (and 
sufficiently) available in the marketplace.  Using a state-of-the-shelf benchmark 
recognizes a commercial best practice balancing of technology, usability, stability, and 
value. 
The NMCI contract specifies four different types of basic "fixed workstation 
seats" (i.e., networked desktop PCs) denoted as "red," "white," "blue," and "thin-client" 
seats.  As an example of the use of benchmarking, the contractually specified technical 
requirement for a "red" seat (the highest priced basic workstation) demands "performance 
equal to or greater than 75 percent of the performance of the high-end commercially 
available state-of-the-shelf workstation at the time it is deployed and refreshed."   
While use of the "state-of-the-shelf" benchmark in the NMCI contract is 
reasonably simple and consistent, it is not necessarily well understood by all parties based 
upon the information contained in the contract.  In order to deal with this situation, the 
NMCI contractor posts to its website a current description of the technical specifications 
delivered for each type of seat.  These specifications are Government approved and 
represent - at any given time - the exact type of hardware that will be provided for each 
type of seat available under the contract. 
In order to establish effective performance measures, the NMCI contract includes 
SLAs to establish the performance-based service goals that the contractor is to meet when 
delivering services.  As modified, the contract includes forty-four separate SLAs that are 
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geared toward broad areas categorized as user upgrades, end-user services, maintenance 
and help desk services, communication services, system services, information assurance 
services, and "other" requirements.   
Each SLA contains various "sub-measures," ranging in quantity from one to 
eleven per SLA (although most SLAs have four or more).  These sub-measures are 
essentially the "service level objectives," or specific areas within each SLA that are 
measured.  Common sub-measures (that appear in many of the individual SLAs) focus on 
customer satisfaction, service availability, system responsiveness, and interoperability.  
The SLAs include reporting requirements and reserve Government or third party audit 
rights. 
With regard to creating effective incentives, the NMCI contract contains a multi-
tiered approach.  There are five discreet financial incentives available to the contractor, of 
which one is explicitly contingent upon the contractor meeting the contract SLAs.  
Although it is not specifically described as one of the five contract incentives, the NMCI 
contract contains a unique payment provision that certainly acts as an incentive.  The 
contract provides that the contractor will only receive payments totaling 85% of the 
contractual seat prices during the transition period until such time as the contractual 
SLAs are met.  There is also a penalty process that is directly related to contractor 
performance as measured by the SLAs. 
The first of five explicit incentives in the NMCI contract is a one-time incentive 
payment of $10 million when the contractor successfully achieves full operational 
capability, which is defined as when the "steady state contract guaranteed number of 
users having the ability to receive ordered services."  The second NMCI incentive is 
related to customer satisfaction.   Per the terms of the contract, the customer satisfaction 
incentive applies only if the contractor meets the SLAs.  The contract provides that 
customer satisfaction will be determined by quarterly surveys of users. 
Assuming that the SLAs are met, the customer satisfaction incentive is $25 per 
seat, per quarter, if more than 85% of users rate NMCI services as "above average" on the 
satisfaction survey.  The incentive is $50 per seat, per quarter, if more than 90% of users 
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rate the services as "above average" on the survey, and $100 per seat, per quarter, if more 
than 95% of users rate the services as "above average." 
The third incentive in the NMCI contract is related to information assurance (IA) 
in order to focus continued high level attention on IA as the actions necessary to secure 
information will change as new attack methods are developed.  An incentive review 
board determines the amount of the IA incentive at the end of each six-month evaluation 
period (with a maximum of $5 million available per period). 
The fourth NMCI incentive is related to small and small disadvantaged business 
subcontracting participation.  The contractor can earn a maximum of $625,000 each six-
month evaluation period if specific subcontracting goals are met.  The fifth incentive, 
similarly, is related to utilization of Indian organizations and Indian-owned economic 
enterprises.  The contract provides that the contractor is allowed payment of five percent 
of the dollar amount subcontracted to Indian organizations or enterprises at any sub-tier.   
 The NMCI incentives are related to the performance measures as expressed by the 
SLAs through the customer satisfaction incentive (which is potentially larger than the 
other incentives combined).  The incentives also relate directly to the NMCI program's 
strategic goals.  The penalty process is based upon points accumulated in a service level 
incentive and penalty - or "SLIP" - account.  The penalty provision is directly tied to the 
performance measures as expressed via the SLAs. 
 The program has a well-developed process to address preparing for the transition 
to NMCI.  Transition planning focuses on both the transition of the IT environment (the 
actual IT assets and services) and the transition of any displaced human capital no longer 
required due to outsourcing of the management and support of the desktop workstations.  
Communication with stakeholders and a thorough site-specific transition process allows 
for effective transition of the IT environment.  The three-tier, site-specific NMCI 
transition process includes stages identified by the contractor as "planning change," "site 
preparation," and "site transformation." 
 In order to smooth the transition of displaced Government employees, the contract 
contains an explicit provision requiring the contractor to offer positions to excess 
personnel.  The contractor offers bonuses and incentives to encourage the transition of 
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excess staff to the contractor's payroll.  The NMCI provisions to deal with excess human 
capital far exceed those of traditional "right of first refusal" clauses. 
 Managing culture change has been a complex issue for NMCI.  Frequent 
communication has been the cornerstone of the Navy's change management process.  
Stakeholders were educated early in the process and consistent messages of support and 
commitment from the agency's leadership have worked diligently to build acceptance and 
ownership of NMCI throughout the enterprise. 
 Well-publicized success stories (such as the quick reconstitution of Pentagon 
computing power after the 2001 terrorist attack) have worked to dispel fears regarding a 
lack of flexibility in the contract approach.  A business case analysis was performed to 
document data that can be used to dispel the "sticker shock" that can accompany a move 
to seat management. 
 
C. THESIS CONCLUSIONS 
The primary conclusion of this thesis is that, overall, the NMCI program has a 
logical and well-developed approach to dealing with the challenges inherent in the seat 
management method of contracting for desktop IT capability.  With respect to each of the 
key challenges identified and explored in this thesis, the program is effectively 
implementing many of the recommendations identified during the literature review.  As 
described in Chapter IV, the structuring of the requirements and the contract, along with 
the actual program execution, have applied most of the GAO recommendations and 
commercial best practices explored in Chapter III. 
The NMCI program's well-developed approach to addressing the challenges and 
concerns associated with seat management contracting is a testament to the pre-award 
and post-award efforts of the Government program and contracting officials.  The 
positive and collaborative relationship between the Government and the NMCI contractor 
has also contributed to the effective response to dealing with the challenges inherent in 
this contracting method. 
The secondary conclusion of this thesis is that, notwithstanding the well-
developed approach in place, there are opportunities for improvement where a few 
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adjustments to the program's approach may help increase the likelihood that NMCI will 
achieve its expected benefits.  While the program has implemented most of the 
recommendations explored earlier in this thesis, there are a few that have not been 
employed.  Additionally, there are some opportunities for improvement in some areas 
where the recommendations have been implemented.  The author's recommendations for 
improvement are set forth in the next section. 
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 1.  Technical Requirement Benchmarks Should Be Revisited Periodically 
 The NMCI program would be well served to develop a plan for periodically 
revisiting the benchmarks utilized to define the contract's technical requirements.  The 
contract requirements for fixed workstations (i.e., networked PCs) are based upon a "state 
of-the-shelf" benchmark. 
For example, the specified technical requirement for a "red" seat (the highest 
priced basic workstation) demands "performance equal to or greater than 75 percent of 
the performance of the high-end commercially available state-of-the-shelf workstation at 
the time it is deployed and refreshed."  The program has provided a way for the 
benchmarks to be translated into currently available specifications (as posted on the 
contractor's website) that are approved by the Government on a quarterly basis. 
However, there is no provision for the benchmarks themselves to be revisited to 
determine whether or not they should be updated to remain relevant to changing user 
needs.  As user needs evolve over time (and in response to technological advancements in 
the marketplace), it is unclear if performance equal to 75 percent "of the performance of 
the high-end commercially available state-of-the-shelf workstation" will be as effective 
or appropriate in meeting end user needs as it was at the time the benchmark was 
established in the contract. 
The author recommends that the NMCI program institute a plan to revisit the 
benchmarks themselves on an annual basis to ensure that the benchmarks remain relevant 
to end-user requirements.  A user survey could be utilized to gauge how well end-users 
perceive that the "red," "white," "blue," or "thin client" seats are satisfying their mission 
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needs.  By periodically revisiting the benchmarks, the NMCI program can ensure that the 
IT capabilities provided remain the best solution available to support the Navy's mission. 
2.  Service Level Agreements Should Be Streamlined 
The NMCI program should undertake an effort to streamline the selected 
performance measures.  As modified, the NMCI contract contains forty-four separate 
service level agreements - or SLAs - that prescribe the specific service goals to be met 
and the methods of monitoring contractor performance.  Each SLA contains various sub-
measures (or service level objectives) ranging in quantity from one to eleven per SLA, 
although most SLAs have at least four sub-measures.    
Considering the forty-four individual SLAs, and the numerous sub-measures, 
there are fully 201 individual performance aspects that are measured.  To further 
complicate matters, each of these 201 performance aspects has three separate standards 
depending upon required "levels of service" which are defined by the options that may 
have been ordered with a given seat.  Specifically, each performance aspect has one 
standard for a "basic" seat (i.e., without any ordered options), another standard for a 
"high-end" seat (i.e., ordered with the high-end upgrade package), and a third standard for 
a "mission critical" seat (i.e., ordered with the mission critical upgrade package).   
Considering the 201 individual performance aspects and the three different 
standards for each, there are over 600 specific performance metrics that must be 
monitored and reported.  While such an extensive, enterprise-wide program as NMCI 
should be expected to have numerous performance measures, there is a tradeoff.  Such an 
extensive number of performance measures requires a great deal of resources (both from 
the contractor and from the Government) to monitor the contractor's compliance.   
While it is important to use an adequate number of measures to monitor the 
important areas of performance, it is also important to restrict the number of measures to 
only those that are truly critical to the mission of the organization.   
The author recommends that the NMCI program undertake an effort to reduce the 
number of SLAs to only those that are truly critical to the two main NMCI strategic goals 
of information superiority (emphasizing connectivity) and fostering innovation 
(emphasizing interoperability).  In addition, an effort should be made to reduce the 
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redundancy in the current number of sub-measures.  For example, customer satisfaction 
can be combined into one SLA vice the current format where customer satisfaction is a 
discreet sub-measure appearing dozens of times across the various SLAs.  A similar 
approach can be used for the sub-measures that currently cross many of the SLAs related 
to availability, responsiveness, and interoperability. 
By streamlining the SLAs so they cover only those performance areas that are 
truly critical for the program's success, efficiencies may be gained and a clear message is 
sent to the contractor as to the performance areas that are vital for the Navy's success. 
3.  Service Level Agreement Management Should Be Improved 
The NMCI program would be well served to develop a plan for periodically 
revisiting the SLAs themselves.  As user needs evolve over time, and as technology 
advances, the service levels expected from a contractor (and the most effective methods 
of monitoring performance) are likely to change. 
Similar to the prior recommendation related to benchmarking technical 
requirements, the author recommends that the NMCI program institute a plan to revisit 
the SLAs themselves on an annual basis to ensure that the selected performance measures 
remain relevant to end-user requirements.  By periodically revisiting the selected SLAs, 
the NMCI program can ensure that the service levels provided remain effective in 
supporting the Navy's mission. 
In addition, the author recommends that the NMCI program consider the viability 
of implementing performance measures calling for escalating performance standards at 
regular intervals.  A further recommendation is that a plan be developed to compare the 
contractor's performance over time (as measured by the SLAs) to other contractors' 
performance on similar seat management efforts.  Although there is no other contract 
exactly like NMCI, certain performance aspects (such as network availability) can be 
benchmarked against the performance of other contractors on smaller, non-military seat 
management efforts. 
 4.  The SLIP Process Should Consider Penalty Best Practices 
The NMCI program should consider modifying the service level incentive and 
penalty, or "SLIP," process to implement additional best practices.  Under the SLIP 
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process, the contractor earns debits and credits of points in an account (known as a SLIP 
account) depending upon whether performance exceeds - or falls below - the standard for 
each performance measure within the SLAs.   Specifically, when the contractor meets or 
exceeds the SLA standards, points are deposited, whereas points are withdrawn if the 
contractor does not meet the SLA standards.   
At the end of the year, a positive balance of points does not result in additional 
incentive payments (as the contractor is rewarded for good performance primarily 
through the customer satisfaction incentive).  However, a negative balance at the end of 
the year will result in the contractor refunding a dollar amount (hence the penalty) up to 
20% of the total seat price.  The actual amount of the refund would be based upon the 
number of negative points in the account at the end of the year multiplied by a 
predetermined dollar value for each point. 
The NMCI approach to penalties complies with some of the commercial best 
practices explored in Chapter III such as considering failure to meet individual SLAs (as 
well as aggregate performance requirements for which the penalty is the 85% payment 
provision).  However, the NMCI contract penalty approach does not consider the other 
best practices such as having increasing penalties for continued poor performance or 
allowing some refund of penalties if required performance levels are restored quickly. 
The author recommends that the NMCI program consider the desirability of 
modifying the SLIP process to provide for increasing penalties for extended periods of 
SLA noncompliance and to provide the potential for withdrawn points to be recovered in 
those instances where SLA compliance is quickly restored.  The penalty process can 
serve as a key complement to the incentive approach in motivating contractor excellence. 
5.  Site-specific Transition Information Should Be Uniform 
The NMCI program should make the various sources of site-specific transition 
information consistent with each other by utilizing uniform labels for transition phases.  
The well-developed transition process as outlined on the contractor's website has three 
phases dubbed "planning change," "site preparation," and "site transformation."  
However, the similarly described site-specific transition process defined on the NMCI 
Director's website (a Government site) labels the three phases as "Pre-Assumption of 
82 
Responsibility," "Assumption of Responsibility to Cutover," and "Cutover."  While it 
seems clear from the tasks and processes contained within each that the phases are the 
same between the two websites, the different labels may nonetheless create confusion. 
The author recommends that uniform labels be applied to the site-specific 
transition phases regardless of whose site (Government or contractor) is accessed for the 
information.  A further recommendation is that the transition information be hosted on a 
single website with a simple link from the other location to ensure the utmost 
consistency.  Eliminating unnecessary confusion and redundant information repositories 
can only help to smooth the transition process.  
6.  Business Case Analysis Information Should Be More Widely Available 
The NMCI program should consider more broadly publicizing the results of the 
business case analysis (BCA) that justified to Congress that NMCI was not more costly 
than the pre-NMCI methods of providing desktop IT capability.  One of the most 
complex challenges when implementing a seat management contract is managing culture 
change.  One source of organizational resistance that must be surfaced and dealt with is 
the potential "sticker shock" as most users (and comptrollers in the Navy's case) do not 
appreciate the true cost of networked PC ownership. 
Effective communication is important to overcome the problem whereby the 
leaders or comptroller of an organization are reluctant to initially endorse a "seat price" of 
$3,500 - or more - per year to get (in their perception) a desktop computer that can be 
bought at the local office supply store for a one-time outlay of $2,000. 
Figures from the Navy's BCA documented that the Navy had computed a figure in 
excess of $3,800 per year per person as the "before NMCI" cost to obtain the services that 
would be provided more effectively (and less expensively) under the NMCI contract. At 
the time the figure was computed, an average seat price figure of $3,412 was used to 
demonstrate savings as a result of NMCI implementation. 
The BCA (which will presumably be updated periodically) can provide strong 
ammunition to battle the "sticker shock" that could contribute to ongoing resistance to the 
implementation of NMCI.  With the exception of one CHIPS Magazine article, it appears 
that the figures from the BCA have not been widely publicized.   
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The author recommends that a summary of the BCA be broadly communicated to 
site-specific organizational leaders and end-users as NMCI continues to roll out seats 
across the enterprise. 
7.  Smaller Success Stories Should Be Publicized 
The NMCI program should establish a method of communicating relevant success 
stories that can help surface and overcome organizational resistance based on fears that 
seat management lacks flexibility.  There have been some dramatic NMCI success stories 
that have been communicated.  For example, one success story – and example of seat 
management flexibility – was the NMCI contractor's efforts to quickly reconstitute the 
Navy's lost IT capabilities after the terrorist attack on the Pentagon in September 2001. 
While most of the stakeholders and many employees are aware of the dramatic 
success story related to the Pentagon, there are smaller success stories that may be more 
relevant to most users and should be promulgated to further address any perceptions of a 
lack of flexibility in seat management contracting.  For example, the activity where the 
author works was flooded in February 2003 rendering the legacy desktop computer 
workstations unusable (along with much of the facility).  By exploiting the NMCI 
program, temporary workspaces for scores of employees were set up in training rooms 
and conference rooms in nearby buildings.  The NMCI contractor accelerated the 
activity's cutover to NMCI and successfully deployed nearly 100 workstations in only a 
few days ensuring that Navy business could quickly resume.   
The author recommends that smaller success stories be promulgated to help 
surface and address any resistance based on fears that NMCI lacks flexibility.  The NMCI 
Director's website (which is relatively new) may be a suitable venue to promulgate such 
success stories and examples of flexibility.  As NMCI is still being implemented across 
the Navy and Marine Corps, it is important that the program continue its efforts to 
manage culture change and overcome organizational resistance.  
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E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1.  Examine the Actual Average Ordered Seat Pricing 
Now that a significant number of seats have been ordered under the NMCI 
program, a study can be performed to compare the actual average seat prices (as ordered) 
with the figures from the business case analysis that supported NMCI.  Such a study may 
provide additional insight on how to counter the "sticker shock" that has been associated 
with this program. 
2.  Analyze Service Level Agreement Compliance Data 
Once the NMCI contractor begins to meet the SLAs, data should become 
available to examine the actual compliance with the SLAs, to identify which SLAs are 
frequently troublesome for the contractor to meet, and to identify which SLAs are 
consistently met or exceeded.  Such an analysis should provide valuable information to 
allow the SLAs to be further tailored as the program moves forward in time. 
3.  Study the Results of Customer Satisfaction Surveys 
As customer satisfaction survey results become available, an examination can be 
made as to whether or not the subjective information solicited provides meaningful 
insight to the objective responses.  A study can also be done to identify potential 
improvements to the satisfaction surveys to ensure that the NMCI customer satisfaction 
incentive is applied in a truly meaningful fashion to motivate contractor excellence. 
4.  Survey Transitioned Former Government Employees 
An undetermined number of excess employees have transitioned to the NMCI 
contractor per the terms of the contract.  A study can be done identifying those 
individuals and surveying the level of their satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the 
transition process.  Such a study should identify opportunities for improvement when 
such large-scale outsourcing initiatives are conducted in the future. 
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